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List of abbreviations 
AHV:= Federal Old Age and Survivors' Insurance 
AHV-HE:= AHV Helplessness Allowance 
AWG:= Ageing Working Group of the European Union (Economic Policy Committee and 
   European Commission - Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs) 
DRG:= Diagnosis-Related Groups, i.e. service-related flat rates or flat-rate payments per case; 
the Swiss system of flat-rate payments per case is known as Swiss DRG. 
EL:= Federal Supplementary Benefits 
ESA:= European System of Accounts 
EU:= European Union 
FFA:= Federal Finance Administration, Federal Department of Finance 
FC:= Federal Council 
FOPH:= Federal Office of Public Health, Federal Department of Home Affairs 
FTA:= Full-Time Equivalents 
GDP:= Gross Domestic Product 
HeL:= Healthcare excluding Long-Term Care 
IPR:= Individual Premium Reduction 
IV:= Federal Disability Insurance 
IV-HE:= IV Helplessness Allowance 
HIA:= Federal Health Insurance Act 
LTC:= Long-Term Care from the Age of 65 
MC:= Managed Care (Integrated Care) 
Obsan:= Swiss Health Observatory 
OKP:= Mandatory Basic Healthcare Insurance 
Seco:= State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, Federal Department of Economic Affairs 
SFSO:= Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Federal Department of Home Affairs 
SUVA≔ Swiss Accident Insurance Fund 
Swiss DRG≔ see DRG 
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Summary 
Following their first publication in 2008 (Colombier and Weber, 2008), the expenditure 
projections for the Swiss healthcare system are now available for the second time. These have 
been drawn up in collaboration with the Federal Office of Public Health. The expenditure 
projections form the basis for the healthcare development scenarios unveiled by the Swiss 
Federal Council as part of the legislature financial planning process (FC 2012: Legislature 
Financial Plan 2013-15, Paragraph 9.1.2 and Appendix 7, publication: January 2012), following 
on from a similar undertaking in 2008. The legal basis for the development scenarios is Article 
8 of the Financial Budget Ordinance which entered into force in April 2006 (see footnote 5). 
The development scenarios are designed to capture longer-term trends such as demographic 
development, which only feed through into the budget and financial plan to a limited degree, 
with a view to assessing their repercussions for the public finances. 
 
A key concern of this study is to evaluate the increase in healthcare expenditure as a result 
of an ageing Swiss population and to highlight the resulting financial burden for the public 
finances and mandatory basic healthcare insurance. In addition, the study also shows the 
adjustment levers through which healthcare policy can influence expenditure development in 
the healthcare system. In addition to the ageing of the population per se, the costs of healthcare 
are also significantly influenced by the relationship between increasing life expectancy and the 
state of health of the population (morbidity rate) on the one hand, and non-demographic cost 
drivers such as advances in medical technology and Baumol’s cost disease (the “Baumol 
Effect”) on the other.  
 
The expenditure projections span the period 2009-2060 and constitute a look into the future, 
an undertaking which is by definition subject to a number of uncertainties. For example, these 
uncertainties include assumptions on macroeconomic developments and cost drivers, as well as 
to a lesser extent assumptions on the demographic scenarios put forward. Accordingly, these 
projections should not be understood as forecasts, but instead represent an extrapolation of long-
term trends and their repercussions for healthcare expenditure. As a consequence, these 
projections neither can nor should allow any conclusion to be drawn with respect to the precise 
level of healthcare expenditure in 50 years’ time. Their aim is rather to provide a rough 
orientation for expenditure development and to show how sensitively expenditure development 
reacts to a variety of cost drivers. With this in mind, various scenarios have been drawn up 
based on the assumption that the prevailing regulatory status quo in healthcare will not change 
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(status quo scenarios, “no policy change”). Furthermore, this study for the first time sets out 
efficiency scenarios which attempt to assess the cost savings achievable as a result of various 
reform measures, such as the promotion of managed care models (integrated care). Other key 
differences to the previous study include the integration of projections for mandatory basic 
healthcare insurance and a comparison with other Swiss studies on this issue. 
 
Where expenditure projections are concerned, a so-called “cohort approach” has been 
adopted in line with the standard international practice of the EU (AWG, 2012) and the OECD 
(Oliveira Martins et al., 2006). In order to determine the additional burden for the public 
finances and mandatory basic healthcare insurance, expenditure projections have to be made in 
a first step for the healthcare system overall. In keeping with standard international practice, 
the expenditure projections are drawn up for two different areas, namely “healthcare excluding 
long-term care” and “long-term care from the age of 65”. 
 
In the following Table Z1, the results are given for the “Reference scenario” of these 
projections, broken down by area and financing sources.  
*** Table Z1 *** 
As expected, the projections show that the ageing of the population is the strong cost driver 
in healthcare. This is particularly true for the long-term care of the population from the age of 
65. More than two thirds of the increase in expenditure in this area is attributable to the ageing 
of the population. Accordingly, the projections indicate that expenditure on long-term care as a 
proportion of GDP will triple between 2009 and 2060. When healthcare excluding long-term 
care is considered, more than half of the cost increase can be explained by non-demographic 
cost drivers such as advances in medical technology. Ageing does have a major role to play 
here too, but the overall average nominal increase over the projection timeframe, which works 
out at 3%, is much lower than the equivalent 4.5% in the case of long-term care. The 
development in long-term care from the age of 65, combined with the additional burden for the 
cantons following the introduction of the new arrangement for the financing of care and for new 
hospital financing (Swiss DRG), will result in the financing burden for the public sector 
increasing by a disproportionate amount compared to the burden on mandatory basic healthcare 
insurance and on private households. Particularly affected by the additional public sector 
burden are the finances of the cantons, which currently meet some 66% of public expenditure 
on healthcare. The strong momentum in the cost development of long-term care is likewise 
reflected in the finances of the communes and the AHV helplessness allowance, for which 
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expenditure will double and treble respectively. In comparison, the cost pressures for the 
Confederation will be less pronounced, as its involvement in the healthcare system is largely 
focused on individual premium reduction. As a significantly lower proportion of expenditure 
on mandatory basic healthcare insurance will be channelled into the financing of care than is 
the case in the public sector, the projections show that expenditure on basic insurance will 
increase less strongly, which in turn means that expenditure on individual premium reduction 
will rise less strongly.  
 
Moreover, the projections reveal that healthcare policy can mitigate the cost pressures via 
the following adjustment levers: 
 The way the population’s state of health develops as life expectancy increases has a 
strong impact on the development of healthcare expenditure. Accordingly, 
preventative healthcare measures can make a substantial contribution to keeping 
healthcare costs in check.  
 In view of the anticipated scarcity of healthcare personnel and a phenomenon known 
as Baumol’s cost disease, additional pressure on healthcare expenditure can be 
expected as a result of above-average increases in wage costs. This pressure can be 
alleviated by forward personnel planning so as to ensure a sufficient supply of 
younger workers in the healthcare area. Close collaboration between the 
Confederation and the cantons is also essential in this context.  
 The question of immigrant labour is also closely interconnected with the anticipated 
scarcity of healthcare personnel. According to the projections of this study, a higher 
net level of immigration is unlikely to bring about a reduction in cost pressure in the 
area of healthcare. This is explained by the fact that stronger economic momentum 
as a result of immigrant labour is almost wholly offset by the associated income 
effects, such as an increased demand for healthcare services. However, if net 
immigration were to be largely concentrated on workers in the healthcare area, the 
picture would improve if this development were to reduce the wage pressure problem 
referred to above. 
 The projections continue to suggest that major cost savings could be realised by 
supply-side reforms, i.e. through efficiency increases in the healthcare system. 
 Finally, cost pressures in long-term care from the age of 65 can be reduced by 
focusing more strongly on the provision of long-term care within the home.  
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The efficiency scenarios indicate that reform measures such as the introduction of electronic 
patient files (as part of an “eHealth” strategy), the promotion of managed care models, and the 
introduction of the new hospital financing system could result in cost-saving effects, but at a 
comparatively low level. According to the projections, the greatest savings would be achieved 
in the area of mandatory basic healthcare insurance. However, the efficiency scenarios are 
subject to a methodological reservation: The cohort approach applied here does not allow a 
picture to be painted of how the players in the healthcare industry would react to reforms. In 
this context a dynamic microsimulation model would be more suitable. Such a model has yet 
to be developed for the Swiss healthcare system, however.  
 
In a comparison with the latest projections on public healthcare expenditure by countries of 
the EU, it becomes clear that the increase in expenditure on healthcare (excluding long-term 
care) in Switzerland is significantly higher than for the average eurozone country. This could 
be attributable to differences in underlying assumptions on demographic development and to a 
different expenditure structure in the base year. By contrast, as a result of developments in long-
term care for people aged 65 and upwards, the additional financing burden on the public 
finances (incl. OKP) in the “Reference scenario” is broadly the same in Switzerland as it is for 
countries of the eurozone.  
 
The comparison with other studies on the long-term development of Swiss healthcare 
expenditure shows that the divergent results are first and foremost attributable to differences in 
the modelling of non-demographic cost drivers. In a number of studies, a trend extrapolation is 
applied for the non-demographic cost drivers. However, this method has the severe drawback 
that spill-over effects between demographic and economic development as well as the dynamic 
development of expenditure in healthcare are not taken into account. For this reason, an 
approach has been selected for this study which takes account of these interrelationships. 
Whatever the approach adopted, however, considerable uncertainties remain with respect to the 
impact of a number of supply-side cost drivers, particularly advances in medical technology.  
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1 Introduction  
Among the countries of the OECD, Switzerland has the third most expensive healthcare 
system as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) at 10.7%, behind only the USA 
(16.4%) and France (11.1%) (data taken from 2008).1 This puts Swiss healthcare expenditure 
significantly above the OECD average of 8.8% of GDP (33 countries). On a per capita basis, 
Switzerland actually spent the second-highest amount of any OECD country in 2008, namely 
USD 3,740 (in purchasing power parities of the year 2000), behind only the USA at USD 6,300. 
As in almost all developed nations, healthcare in Switzerland is exposed to strong upward cost 
pressures. For example, expenditure on healthcare expressed as a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) more than doubled in Switzerland between 1960 and 2009, from 4.8% to 11.4% 
(see Figure 1). This development is likely to be attributable to a number of factors specific to 
healthcare provision. For one thing, the provision of healthcare services has a long track record 
of market failures.2 In addition, a number of distributional objectives were defined with the 
introduction of the Federal Health Insurance Act (HIA) in 1996.3 If the failure of the market is 
to be corrected and the distributional objectives achieved, strong government regulation will be 
required. When regulation is being drawn up, there is a risk that the influence of powerful 
lobbying associations in the healthcare industry and interest-led policy will result in the 
objectives of the regulation not being met and healthcare expenditure actually mushrooming. 
Market failure would then be compounded by subsequent political or government failure.4 But 
even if politicians act solely with the benefit of the people in mind, it is difficult to structure 
reforms with any degree of exactitude given the complexity of the healthcare system and the 
associated transaction costs involved. On top of this comes the fact that growing prosperity 
leads to greater demands of the healthcare system being made by the population.  
                                                 
The expenditure projections for healthcare were drawn up in collaboration with the Federal Office of Public 
Health. At this point I would like to offer my warm thanks for the valuable commentaries and suggestions put 
forward by the support group of the SFOPH under Stefan Spycher. This working paper likewise benefited from 
the constructive contributions of France Weaver and Marc Wildi, who examined the 2012 development scenarios 
and the projection methodology applied here. Finally I would like to thank my colleagues from the Economic 
Analysis and Policy Advice department of the FFA for their valuable input. Any errors or faults that remain are 
the sole responsibility of the author. In addition, the usual disclaimer applies (see inside of front cover). 
1 The year 2008 is used for the comparison of expenditure as a percentage of GDP, as the most recent available 
data at the point this data was drawn from the OECD healthcare statistics in 2009 is heavily influenced by the 
financial and economic crisis. 
2 For more on market failures in healthcare and their macroeconomic significance see Hsiao and Heller (2007), 
for example. 
3 According to these objectives, access to high-quality healthcare provision should be guaranteed (provision 
objective), and individuals with modest incomes should be financially supported (solidarity objective). In addition, 
the increase in healthcare expenditure should be contained (cost containment objective). 
4 For a detailed treatment of distributional aspects, market failures, and government failures in healthcare see 
Rice (2003). 
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*** Figure 1 *** 
An additional challenge confronting the financing sources of the healthcare system, such as 
the public finances and mandatory basic healthcare insurance (OKP), is an ageing Swiss 
population. According to the medium base scenario of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
(SFSO) (A-00-2010), the over 80-year-old segment of the population alone is expected to more 
than double between 2009 and 2060, from just under 5% to just under 12%. This much can also 
be adduced from the fact that in 2009 there were around three full-time equivalent workers for 
every pensioner, whereas this ratio will amount to just 1.5 to 1 by 2060 according to the SFSO’s 
demographic scenario A-00-2010. Accordingly, healthcare is an area in which the state will 
have to grapple with major financial policy challenges in the foreseeable future.  
 
This consideration motivated the Swiss Federal Council to once again draw up development 
scenarios for healthcare as part of the legislature financial planning process (FC 2012: 
Legislature Financial Plan 2013-15, Paragraph 9.1.2 and Appendix 7), following on from a 
similar undertaking in 2008. The legal basis for these so-called development scenarios is Article 
8 of the Financial Budget Ordinance, which entered into force in April 2006.5 The development 
scenarios are designed to capture longer-term trends such as demographic developments, which 
only feed through into the budget and financial plan to a limited degree, with a view to assessing 
their repercussions for the Swiss public finances. The Federal Council first presented 
development scenarios for healthcare as a part of the report on the Legislature Financial Plan 
2009-2011 (FC, 2008).  
 
This study sets out the basis for the development scenarios. The time horizon selected is the 
period 2009-2060. The purpose of the expenditure projections is to highlight the future financial 
additional burden on the public finances and mandatory basic health insurance (OKP), but also 
on society overall and therefore Swiss households, as a result of the anticipated cost pressures 
in the area of healthcare. In addition, the study also aims to highlight the adjustment levers with 
which healthcare policy can influence expenditure development in the area of healthcare.  
 
                                                 
5 Article 8 of the Financial Budget Ordinance reads as follows: 
1 To supplement the Financial Plan, the Federal Council will periodically submit, at a minimum every 
four years, longer-term development scenarios for certain task areas. 
2 The development scenarios stretch several years beyond the Financial Plan, and will be drawn up on the 
basis of the longer-term development of the finances of all three levels of government as well as the 
social security funds. 
They highlight the development trends with their financial consequences as well as potential controlling and 
correction measures. 
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However, this focus on the problem of rising healthcare costs should not blind us to the fact 
that a well-functioning healthcare system is of great benefit to society, insofar as it preserves 
and improves the state of the population’s health. Indeed, given that it can improve the health 
of the population, healthcare can actually have a positive impact on economic growth (Suhrcke 
et al., 2006). It has been demonstrated, for example, that the preservation of a good state of 
health promotes the formation of human capital and productivity. In addition, a healthcare 
system helps a society exploit the full potential of its labour force by reducing illness-related 
absenteeism. As a consequence, the rising costs of healthcare provision are not disadvantageous 
as long as they can be set against an increase in social wellbeing of at least a similar magnitude.  
 
In addition to providing a detailed commentary on the results, which have already been 
presented in brief in the 2012 development scenarios (FC, 2012), this study also looks at the 
methodological aspects of the projections and undertakes a comparison with the results of the 
EU and other Swiss studies. Projecting future developments is inevitably bound up with 
uncertainties, particularly over such a long timeframe. Accordingly, these projections should 
not be understood as forecasts, but instead represent a projection of long-term trends and their 
repercussions for healthcare expenditure. As a consequence, these projections neither can nor 
should allow any conclusion to be drawn with respect to the precise level of healthcare 
expenditure in 50 years’ time. Their aim is rather to provide a rough orientation for expenditure 
development and to show how sensitively expenditure development reacts to a variety of cost 
drivers. Various scenarios involving different underlying assumptions for the repercussions of 
cost drivers have therefore been drawn up. These scenarios illustrate how healthcare 
expenditure would change if the political parameters relevant to the healthcare system were to 
undergo no change compared to the current status quo (status quo scenarios, “no policy 
change”). Unlike in the expenditure projections drawn up in 2008, efficiency scenarios are also 
taken into account here. In these scenarios, an attempt is made to illustrate the cost-saving 
effects that current attempts at reform (such as the promotion of managed care models) could 
have on long-term expenditure development. Furthermore, these projections differ from those 
of 2008 in that expenditure projections for mandatory basic healthcare insurance (OKP) are 
presented for the first time. There are also a number of other differences, in particular with 
respect to certain details in the construction of the scenarios.  
 
It should additionally be borne in mind that the selected methodology is subject to certain 
limitations. As already mentioned, projecting future scenarios inevitably involves a number of 
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uncertainties. That said, a proportion of demographic development is already established on the 
basis of past developments, which increases the reliability of demographic scenarios. 
Uncertainties nonetheless remain, particularly with respect to migration assumptions. Other 
uncertainties include predictions on macroeconomic development, which likewise have an 
impact on non-democratic cost drivers. Even assuming that the course of Swiss macroeconomic 
development were known, there would still be considerable uncertainty over the non-
demographic cost drivers, the magnitude of the cost effects, and the way these should be 
modelled. This is particularly true of advances in the area of medicine. For that reason, studies 
such as Vuilleumier et al. (2007) undertake a trend extrapolation for the effects of non-
demographic cost drivers. In our view, however, this approach has a crucial flaw in that it fails 
to take account of the interrelationships between demographic development, macroeconomic 
development, and healthcare expenditure. This can result in contradictions arising between the 
assumptions made. For that reason, this study has deliberately adopted an approach that takes 
into account the above-mentioned interrelationships. 
 
Viewed in overall terms, the current projections confirm the results of the predecessor study 
(Colombier and Weber, 2008). The area of long-term care from the age of 65 is particularly 
influenced by the ageing of the population. Where healthcare excluding long-term care is 
concerned, ageing is likewise a factor in the mix, but here the non-demographic cost drivers 
such as advances in medical technology are more important. This characteristic gives a wider 
range of options to policymakers than if expenditure development were purely driven by 
demographics. In terms of the public finances, it is the cantons that are particularly affected. 
The efficiency scenarios indicate that reforms such as the promotion of managed care have 
rather a limited impact. In the long term, savings are most likely to be realised in the OKP. 
 
This study is structured as follows. In Section 2, the methodology applied in the expenditure 
projections is explained. In Section 3, the ageing of the Swiss population is highlighted along 
with the key cost drivers in Switzerland’s healthcare system. Section 4 looks at the status quo 
scenarios. Sections 5 to 7 focus on the results of the expenditure projections for the healthcare 
system overall, for the public finances, and for the OKP. Section 8 sets out the efficiency 
scenarios. A comparison of the results of this study with those of the predecessor study and 
other studies on the Swiss and EU healthcare systems is undertaken in Section 9. In the final 
section of this present paper some conclusions are drawn.  
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2 Projection methodology 
2.1 The selected approach 
In order for the results of this study to be comparable with the projections of the EU in 
particular, the methodology of these expenditure projections mirrors that of studies conducted 
by the Ageing Working Group of the EU (AWG, 2006, 2009, 2012) and the OECD (Oliveira 
Martins et al., 2006). This methodology is known as the cohort approach. Its distinguishing 
feature is that healthcare expenditure, broken down by so-called “age cohorts”, is projected in 
line with population development over a longer timeframe, which in this study covers the period 
2009-2060 (see Paragraph 2.2). Where the development of the Swiss population is concerned, 
the medium base scenario of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (A-00-2010) has been adopted 
(see Table 1).  
*** Table 1 *** 
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of expenditure projections to a higher level of net 
immigration, an alternative population scenario has also been drawn up (A-17-2010). The 
project timeframe of around 50 years has been chosen so as to allow the costs of an ageing 
population to be fully factored in, particularly with respect to the baby boomer generation. In 
addition to ageing, other non-demographic cost drivers such as advances in medical technology 
are also taken into account. This also involves making certain assumptions regarding future 
macroeconomic development.   
*** Table 2 *** 
Where macroeconomic data such as gross domestic product (GDP) and wage developments 
is concerned, the assumptions are the same as those in the long-term outlook for Swiss public 
finances (see Geier and Zahno, 2012, 18).6 For the years 2011 to 2015, the macroeconomic 
figures of the (federal) Legislature Financial Plan 2013-15 have been used, while for the years 
2009 to 2010 the data from the national accounts of the SFSO has been used (see Table 2). 
From 2016 onwards, GDP growth rates have been derived from a combination of assumed 
productivity advances (1% p.a.) and the development of the wage-earning population in full-
time equivalents (FTEs) which result from the hypothesised population development scenarios. 
In the case of the GDP projections, a straightforward trend is replicated, and potential economic 
fluctuations are not factored in. For the years 2009 to 2015, the GDP trend is predicted with the 
existence of the so-called “k coefficient”.7 
                                                 
6 It should be pointed out here that the reverse also applies: a proportion of the expenditure projections for 
healthcare is in turn incorporated into the long-term outlook.  
7 For an explanation of the “k” coefficient see Colombier (2006, 523), for example. 
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Healthcare expenditure is typically expressed as a proportion of GDP. The reason for this is 
as follows: GDP is an indicator of total economic income. By expressing healthcare expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP, it can be seen how much a society is paying for its healthcare as a 
proportion of its income. This in turn shows how an increase in healthcare expenditure 
represents an additional burden on society as a whole, as well as for individual financing sources 
such as the public sector and the OKP. If healthcare expenditure is expressed as a proportion of 
GDP, this also strips out the effect of population growth on healthcare expenditure. This can be 
illustrated by means of a straightforward observation. If one assumes that all age cohorts of the 
population grow at the same percentage rate, the structure of the population will not change. 
Accordingly, the working age population as a proportion of the overall population will remain 
constant. In other words, GDP growth that derives from the increase in the working-age 
population will virtually match the increase in healthcare expenditure. As a consequence, the 
size of the population has no impact on the proportion between healthcare expenditure and 
GDP.  
*** Figure 2 *** 
As the different cost drivers and indeed the same cost drivers have a different level of impact 
on different areas of the healthcare system, healthcare expenditure in the expenditure 
projections is typically broken down into the areas of healthcare excluding long-term care 
(HeL) and long-term care from 65 years of age (LTC) (e.g. AWG, 2012) (see Figure 2).8 All 
that remains is long-term care for the under-65 age group. In a first step, the overall expenditure 
for each area is projected on the basis of this breakdown. In a second step, the proportion of 
healthcare expenditure financed by the public sector and the OKP is carried forward in the form 
of projected expenditure for the entire healthcare system. Figure 2 provides an overview of the 
projection methodology. 
*** Figure 3 *** 
The data for healthcare expenditure is taken from the SFSO statistics for “Healthcare costs 
and services”.9 The most recent data available at the time the projections were drawn up relates 
to 2009, making this the base year for the projections. The graphic illustration of expenditure 
per capita of population (depending on age group) is described as the expenditure profile (see 
Figure 3).10 In order to project the healthcare expenditure for the HeL and LTC areas, the 
                                                 
8 For a formal representation of the project methodology see Appendix A1. 
9 For an overview of the data base applied see Appendix A3, Table A3. 
10 The expressions “expenditure per capita” and “expenditure per inhabitant” are used synonymously in this 
paper.  
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expenditure profiles are further differentiated by gender as well as by outpatient and inpatient 
treatment. The latter distinction is required for the projections of public healthcare expenditure. 
If the per capita expenditure for the age cohorts of these expenditure profiles is multiplied by 
the development of the population in the relevant age cohorts according to the SFSO 
projections, the effect of the change of age structure and population size on healthcare 
expenditure can be established. Here it is assumed that population development has no influence 
on per capita expenditure and thus no impact on the price or the extent of services (e.g. 
therapies, medications) per capita. Consequently, this cost effect can be used to express how a 
change in the age structure of the population and the number of inhabitants in Switzerland will 
have the effect of changing overall demand for healthcare services. For the sake of simplicity, 
the expenditure on long-term care of the under 65-year-old age group is extrapolated in line 
with GDP. 
 
The starting point for the projections is therefore the expenditure profiles broken down by 
age, gender, and inpatient and outpatient services. The SFSO breaks down these profiles into 
5-year age cohorts. According to several epidemiological theories, the increase in life 
expectancy assumed in the demographic scenarios correlates closely with the development of 
the state of the population’s health and therefore the population’s morbidity rate (see Section 
3.1). In order to reflect morbidity changes in the projections appropriately, however, healthcare 
expenditure needs to be annualised. Furthermore, the analysis of the impact of morbidity 
requires the establishment of the probability of an average person in each age group falling sick 
or requiring care. However, as things stand there is virtually no data for such illness frequencies, 
which is why – just as in the studies of the EU (AWG, 2009, 2012) and the OECD (Martins et 
al., 2006) – the change in expenditure per inhabitant has to be used as a proxy for the change in 
morbidity (see Paragraph 4.2, Box 1). 11’12 When extrapolating LTC expenditure, the EU 
approach differs from this study in that it applies care requirement ratios.  
 
For the HeL area, the annualisation of the expenditure profiles is only carried out from the 
                                                 
11 It should be stressed here that the modelling of changes of morbidity in both these projections and those of 
the OECD and the EU presuppose the following correlation. The expenditure per inhabitant, E/Pop, can be 
described as the product of expenditure per patient, E/Pat, and the probability of falling ill, P/Pop. A decline in the 
morbidity rate means a decline in P/Pop. Assuming that a change in the morbidity rate does not have an impact on 
the expenditure per patient, E/Pat, if all other things remain the same this leads to a proportional reduction in 
expenditure per inhabitant, E/Pop. If this premise is not correct, the effect of morbidity changes will be distorted 
in the expenditure projections.  
12 In a recent study, the Swiss Health Observatory has predicted the care requirement ratios for long-term care 
of Swiss people from the age of 65 up until the year 2030 (Bayer-Oglesby and Höpflinger, 2010).  
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age of 40 upwards. The reason for this is the fact that the per capita expenditure of the base year 
2009 is fairly low up to the age of 40, exhibiting a comparatively weak rise, with morbidity 
proving a problem for the elderly in particular. Where annualisation is concerned, it is assumed 
that the average expenditure of each five-year age cohort is equivalent to the expenditure 
incurred by the median age of this cohort. For those aged 96 and above, it is assumed that 
expenditure per capita remains constant. As a result of significant differences in life expectancy 
between the different age groups, as well as between men and women, it is not the change in 
average life expectancy of the population as a whole that is used to determine the effects of 
morbidity, but the change of life expectancy according to age group and gender. In the base 
year of 2009, the profile illustrated in Figure 4a reflects the per capita expenditure of inpatient 
treatment in hospitals for women and men. Figures 4b to 4d illustrate the expenditure profiles 
for the services of care homes and inpatient treatment in both HeL and LTC. 
*** Figures 4a-d *** 
In addition to the ageing of the population, various other important cost drivers in healthcare 
are also taken into account. These are examined more closely in Section 3. As there are a 
number of uncertainties regarding the extent of the impact of the various cost drivers, several 
different scenarios have been drawn up (see Section 4). Before taking a look at these cost drivers 
and the scenarios constructed around them, the next section discusses the projection approach 
adopted in this study. 
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2.2 Discussion of the approach 
2.2.1 Classification of the projection methodology 
In addition to the cohort model, various other models are also used for the projection of 
healthcare expenditure (see Astolfi et al., 2011, 14 et seq.). The choice of model is typically 
decided by the objective of the study and the availability of data. The different models can be 
classified according to both the degree of detail with which they replicate the structures of 
healthcare and in the forecasting horizon they apply: 
 Component models (incl. cohort approach): For these projections, healthcare 
expenditure is broken down into various different areas of healthcare or/and into groups 
of individuals such as age cohorts. If age cohorts are used, the term “cohort approach” 
is used. The age cohorts can then be subdivided by applying further criteria such as 
gender or the type of healthcare services used. For each age cohort, per capita 
expenditure (average costs) is determined, which is then multiplied by the projected 
development of the age cohort in question in order to project future cost development. 
Such an approach is by its nature static, however, as the average costs do not change 
over the course of time. In order to make the average costs dynamic, further cost 
determinants such as advances in medical technology or a change in the morbidity rate 
are factored in. Models of this kind are particularly suitable for illustrating the effects 
of longer-term developments – such as the ageing of the population – on healthcare 
expenditure. A key drawback of this model is the fact that feedback effects, such as a 
response of private households to a rise in healthcare expenditure, cannot be factored 
in. In this respect, component models are very limited in their suitability for the analysis 
of healthcare policy measures, as the impact of the measures has to be given 
exogenously. 
 Microsimulation models (dynamic): These models focus on the micro level, i.e. the 
level of an individual entity such as a private household or company. Dynamic models 
can be used to simulate how the characteristics of individual entities develop over time, 
for example. These models are able to illustrate how the state of health of individuals 
changes over an entire lifespan up to death, depending on a large number of factors such 
as age, gender, lifestyle habits, education, family, etc. A simulated individual is able to 
learn over the course of time and to change his or her pattern of behaviour accordingly. 
These simulations are used for a representative sample of an overall population, such as 
the population of a country. These models can be used to replicate the effects of an 
ageing population on healthcare expenditure. In addition, interactions between 
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individuals and responses to political measures such as tax increases can be simulated. 
As a result, these models are particularly suitable for the analysis of longer-term 
repercussions of health policy measures. On the other hand, the data requirement for 
these models is very onerous, and developing such models is an extremely complex 
undertaking. For that reason, models of this kind have rarely been used up until now for 
the projection of healthcare expenditure.13  
 Macro models: These models are time series models that can be used to draw up short-
term forecasts for overall healthcare expenditure. Ideally, there should be no structural 
breaks in the underlying time series. Examples of such models in Switzerland include 
the OKP forecast model of the Zurich University of Applied Sciences in Winterthur, 
and the healthcare forecast model of the KOF Swiss Economic Institute of ETH Zurich 
(Wildi et al., 2004; Abrahamsen et al., 2005). The category of macro models also 
includes computable general equilibrium models. These models break down the 
economy into two sectors, healthcare and the remaining economy. Equilibrium models 
can provide insights into how an increase in healthcare expenditure has an impact on 
total economic income or social wellbeing via a reaction on the part of consumers and 
investors, for example. However, equilibrium models have a number of drawbacks. In 
particular, they rest on highly simplified assumptions regarding the behaviour of private 
households, companies and governments. Unlike microsimulation models, equilibrium 
models focus on the analysis of a representative individual rather than on the analysis 
of a representative population. In addition, the equilibrium is defined by parameters 
which do not change over the course of time. Finally, states of equilibrium are taken 
into account prior to and after a political intervention, but the same is not true of the 
adjustment process from one state of equilibrium to another.  
2.2.2 Identification of non-demographic cost drivers 
In the light of the above, it is clear that both the cohort approach and a dynamic microsimulation 
model may be suitable for expenditure projections in the area of healthcare. Up until now, only 
the cohort approach has been pursued in the analysis of ageing in the Swiss healthcare system 
(see Table 3).  
*** Table 3 *** 
In addition to differences in the level of detail and the time horizon applied, cohort studies also 
differ in the way non-demographic cost drivers are identified. This is a reflection of the fact that 
                                                 
13 For an example of a recent study, see Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, Sweden, 2010.  
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there is a greater degree of uncertainty surrounding non-demographic cost drivers than there is 
for demographic cost drivers. 
 
Essentially, a distinction can be made between two approaches for identifying non-
demographic cost drivers (see Table 3). As part of the residual approach, the expenditure trend 
attributable to non-demographic cost drivers is extrapolated from the past (Vuilleumier et al., 
2007). In other words, the expenditure impact of the non-demographic cost drivers is captured 
in the form of a residual value, the residual growth rate, which cannot be explained by 
demographic cost determinants. In the second approach, a correlation is assumed to exist 
between projected overall economic development, non-demographic cost determinants and 
expenditure dynamism in healthcare. As well as being used for this study, this approach is also 
adopted by the OECD (Oliveira-Martins et al., 2006) and by the Ageing Working Group 
(AWG) of the EU (AWG, 2012).  
 
When extrapolating expenditure growth that cannot be explained by demographic cost 
drivers, it is assumed that – irrespective of demographic changes – the future will be a mirror 
of the past. And yet the macroeconomic parameters are in fact changing through the very fact 
of demographic development alone. The projected decline in the working-age population is 
therefore having a restrictive effect on economic momentum, even if other parameters remain 
the same. As healthcare can hardly be decoupled from overall economic development in the 
long run, this is inevitably going to have an impact on healthcare expenditure.14 As well as 
assuming that macroeconomic development in the future will mirror that of the past, an 
extrapolation also disregards the impact of demographic changes on macroeconomic 
development and therefore on healthcare expenditure. For this reason, the assumption is made 
in this study that there is a correlation between demographic developments, macroeconomic 
development, and healthcare expenditure.  
 
It is striking that the projected development of the expenditure trend in this study works out 
significantly weaker than a pure extrapolation of the same trend. The very point is made by 
Wildi (2011), for example.15 Contrasting such a naive extrapolation of the expenditure trend 
from 1970 to 2009 expressed as a proportion of GDP (see Figure 5, green dashed line) with the 
                                                 
14 To assume a decoupling would be to imply that a nation’s entire GDP would have to be generated through 
healthcare alone at some point.  
15 Cf. the report by Wildi (2011) on the projection methodology applied in this analysis.  
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expenditure trend of the “Reference scenario” (see Figure 5, dotted blue line) reveals a “forecast 
kink”.  
*** Figure 5 *** 
The linear trends have been drawn up in keeping with the approach taken by Wildi (2011). 
Here a simple line is drawn between the start value and the end value of expenditure over the 
period in question, namely between 1970 and 2009 for the trend extrapolation, and between 
2009 and 2060 for the “reference scenario”. In view of increasing demographic pressures, the 
weakening trend that emerges from the “reference scenario” raises the question as to whether 
future expenditure development is being systematically underestimated with this approach 
(Wildi, 2011). 
 
This may be countered first of all by observing that these projections are designed to be 
anything but a straightforward extrapolation of past development into the future. After all, as 
much relevant information as possible is supposed to be taken into account in these expenditure 
projections. In this respect, the methodology applied here does not constitute a naive projection 
when compared to an extrapolation. Furthermore, with a naive trend extrapolation one is 
confronted with the difficulty of choosing the appropriate timeframe. An extrapolated trend 
reacts very sensitively to the choice of timeframe. For example, it may be observed that there 
was significantly steeper growth in inflation-adjusted healthcare expenditure per capita between 
1960 and 1975 than in subsequent years (see Appendix A2, Figure A2.2). This is demonstrated 
by the fact that the median growth rate for inflation-adjusted expenditure in the years 1970-
2009 (3.3%) is significantly higher than the median growth rate between 1976 and 2009 (3.0%). 
If the timeframe for the trend extrapolation is limited to the period 1976-2009, there is a strong 
flattening of the extrapolated trend accordingly (see Figure 5, green line). One reason why the 
trend in the “Reference scenario” works out considerably weaker when compared to the past is 
that a far weaker level of economic growth is expected to apply in the period 2009-2060. Indeed, 
it is assumed that real GDP will grow at an average rate of just under 1% a year. By contrast, 
the average annual growth rate for the period 1976-2008 is much higher at 1.9%.16 If a scenario 
such as the “GDP trend” scenario simulates this higher rate of economic momentum on the 
basis of the “Reference scenario”, the resulting trend is a much closer to the extrapolated trend 
for the period 1976-2009 (see Figure 5, blue and green line).17 This shows that the “forecast 
                                                 
16 The crisis year of 2009 is excluded, as the economy rebounded immediately afterwards, and healthcare 
expenditure reacts only very slowly to a change in GDP.  
17 For the relevant comparative period of 1970 to 2009, an income elasticity of 1.15 is estimated. This elasticity 
value, which deviates from the "Reference scenario" (income elasticity: 1.1), is taken over accordingly for the 
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kink” is partly attributable to the significantly weaker assumed level of economic momentum 
compared to the past. If the “GDP trend” is further enhanced by the thoroughly plausible 
assumption that the price increase for healthcare services in the HeL area will prove ¼ higher 
than the inflation rate as a result of the Baumol Effect (“GDP trend plus Baumol” scenario), 
expenditure develops even more dynamically than it does with the trend extrapolations (see 
Figure 5, dotted blue line). In this case, the “Forecast” does not shift downwards, as it does for 
the “Reference scenario”, but upwards. In view of the fact that the development of healthcare 
expenditure is shaped by the interaction between various cost drivers, economic developments, 
and demographic developments, however, a “forecast kink” in itself is unlikely to allow any 
confident statement to be made regarding the value of the projection. Moreover, using an 
unsophisticated extrapolation of the expenditure trend as a measure for projections gives rise to 
a number of significant problems, not least the choice of the appropriate timeframe. 
 
In the view of Wildi (2011), a further weakness of the approach selected here is the fact that 
the expenditure ratio (healthcare expenditure as a proportion of GDP) does not fluctuate in line 
with GDP. The logic behind the argument put forward by Wildi (2011) is as follows: Nominal 
healthcare expenditure is barely affected by economic developments, but as GDP is subject to 
economic fluctuations, the expenditure ratio rises more strongly in times of recession (all other 
things being equal), and rises to a lesser extent (or even falls) during peaks of the economic 
cycle. Over a longer timeframe, however, economic developments cannot be predicted, so on 
pragmatic grounds alone it is advisable to base expenditure projections on a long-term GDP 
trend. Accordingly, the economic cycle is stripped out of GDP development for the purposes 
of these projections, which means the expenditure ratio remains independent of economic 
development. In addition, the results of the empirical analysis of cost drivers in the Swiss 
healthcare system indicate that there is a close correlation in the long term between economic 
growth on the one hand and expenditure development in healthcare on the other (see Appendix 
A2). This is taken into account in the projections accordingly. 
 
In addition, projections for healthcare expenditure also have limitations insofar as we remain 
largely in the dark with respect to the influence channels of advances in medical technology. 
This is due to the fact that such advances are highly complex and thus very difficult to gauge 
on an empirical basis, particularly at the macro level (see Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 6 et 
seq.). Accordingly, advances in medical technology can only be very roughly incorporated into 
                                                 
“GDP trend” scenario. For a detailed illustration of income elasticity estimates see Appendix A2.  
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the expenditure projections, which in turn increases the uncertainty of those projections (see 
also Section 3.3). Different approaches are therefore adopted by different studies to take 
account of advances in medical technology when undertaking expenditure projections. 
Essentially a distinction is made between two approaches. In the so-called residual approach, 
an expenditure trend based on advances in medical technology – but also on other supply-side 
factors such as the change in relative prices – is extrapolated from the past. This is the approach 
taken by the OECD (Oliviera-Martins, 2006) and by the Australian Productivity Commission 
(2005), for example. The basis of this approach is an estimate involving real per capita 
healthcare expenditure as the dependent variable and the cost drivers that apply in the case in 
question. Advances in medical technology are therefore to be incorporated through the 
inclusion of a deterministic trend (see AWG, 2009, 933 et seq.; Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 
9 et seq.). The expenditure trend established in this way can be viewed as the residual cost factor 
that remains after removing the impact of all cost drivers explicitly factored in. A residual trend 
can also be established with the help of expenditure profiles from the past (see Productivity 
Commission AUS, 2008, Chap. 1.1). This approach corresponds to that used for the 
extrapolation of expenditure. Demographic development in the past, broken down by age 
cohorts, is multiplied by the per capita expenses that apply for the relevant age cohort in 
question. The aggregate per capita expenditure for all age cohorts is then extrapolated on the 
basis of observable non-demographic cost drivers.18 The growth established in this way is then 
deducted from the actual rise in per capita expenditure. The resulting residual rise is then 
assigned to advances in medical technology but also to other non-observable supply-side 
factors. Where the non-demographic cost drivers are concerned, studies frequently rely on the 
parameter estimates of a regression. The residual approach to determine the influence of 
advances in medical technology involves the extrapolation of a past trend, and is therefore 
linked to the above–mentioned residual approach for the totality of non-demographic cost 
drivers.  
 
The alternative approach is based on the assumption that there is a long-term 
interdependency between the influence of medical advances in healthcare on the one hand and 
general macroeconomic development on the other. Advances in medical technology are 
captured with the assistance of the correlation between GDP and healthcare expenditure via 
income elasticity (see Section 3). This indirect approach is adopted by both this study and that 
                                                 
18 The OECD approach only takes into account macroeconomic income as a non-demographic cost 
determinant, and assumes an income elasticity of one (see Oliviera Martins et al., 2006, 12).  
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of the EU Ageing Working Group (AWG), for example (see Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 6 
et seq.).19 The justification for this approach is the fact that empirical studies regularly indicate 
that the effect of GDP on healthcare expenditure is exaggerated – i.e. they suggest too high a 
level of income elasticity – inasmuch as advances in medical technology are not directly taken 
into account through a proxy in the regression (see Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 17; Smith et 
al., 2009, 1280; Oliviera Martins et al., 2006, 76, Appendix A2). Consequently, at least a 
proportion of the impact of advances in medical technology would appear to be reflected in 
income elasticity. In addition, an empirical analysis of the cost drivers in the Swiss healthcare 
system in the current study suggests that Swiss healthcare expenditure has so far not followed 
any deterministic trend (see Appendix A2). This is an argument against the use of the residual 
approach in the case of Switzerland.  
 
According to our estimates, long-term expenditure dynamics in Switzerland are essentially 
driven by real GDP, demographics, and advances in medical technology (see Appendix A2). 
Indeed, a cointegration between these variables and real per capita expenditure can be 
demonstrated. These cost drivers each explain around a third of the rise of expenditure between 
1975 and 2009.20 Where advances in medical technology are concerned, a frequently-applied 
proxy has been selected, namely the research and development expenditure of the USA on 
healthcare (USA R&D) (see Productivity Commission AUS, 2005, Chap. 1.2, for example). 
The estimates indicate that the coefficients of real GDP and the proxy for demographics – 
namely the proportion of the overall population aged 65 and older – are overestimated if 
advances in medical technology are not taken into account in the regression equation. This 
would suggest that advances in medical technology are reflected in the overestimated 
coefficients.21 As such, the overestimation of the coefficients is likely to account for a large 
proportion of the effect of advances in medical technology as captured by the USA R&D proxy. 
For example, at least where the whole sample for the period 1960-2009 is concerned, the 
explanatory contribution of the regression works out at 99% irrespective of whether the USA 
R&D proxy is taken into account in the estimation equation (see Appendix A2, Table 2.4). 
Furthermore, the results suggest a strong correlation between advances in medical technology 
and the costs that are attributable to the rising proportion of the older population, i.e. that aged 
                                                 
19 However, the EU AWG (2009, Annex 2) also uses the residual approach to evaluate the cost impact of 
advances in medical technology in extra scenarios.  
20 This result is consistent with the results arrived at by Smith et al. (2009, 1276) for the USA. These broadly 
suggest that between 27% and 48% of the rise in expenditure since 1960 is attributable to medical advances. 
21 For the correlation between total economic income and advances in medical technology see Section 3.3. 
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65 and upwards. The same conclusion is also reached by Dormont et al. (2006, 958) with their 
microsimulation for the French healthcare system. According to this study, product innovations 
such as the introduction of new medications have a substantial influence on the level of 
expenditure for the older population. Accordingly, advances in medical technology would lead 
to a disproportionate increase in expenditure for the older part of the population, so that the rise 
of the expenditure profile such as that illustrated in Figure 3 would continuously steepen with 
the passage of time. This effect of advances in medical technology is not taken into account in 
the expenditure projections of this study, which means that the cost effects of advances in 
medical technology may be underestimated as a result.22 In summary, and given the current 
state of our knowledge, it may be said that healthcare expenditure projections suffer from the 
fact that major uncertainties surround the cost impact of advances in medical technology.  
3 Cost drivers in healthcare 
Among the key cost drivers in healthcare is the ageing of the population. This cost driver 
has already been discussed in detail as part of the methodological explanations set out in section 
2.1. This section therefore focuses on the other cost drivers that are significant for cost 
development in healthcare besides an ageing population. These cost drivers exercise an impact 
on expenditure per capita (population) as displayed in equation (1). A better understanding of 
these cost drivers can be gained by breaking down expenditure per capita of population (average 
costs) into the following components: 23'24 
 
 Expenditure per capita of population  (1) 
= 
Expenditure per service x Services per patient x Patients per capita of population 
= 
Expenditure per service x Services per capita of population        
 
Expenditure per capita can be broken down into expenditure per healthcare service provided 
(price), the services provided per patient (services used per patient) and the number of patients 
                                                 
22 As far as the author is aware, no age-specific effect as a result of advances in medical technology has yet 
been taken into account in long-term healthcare projections. Steinmann and Telser (2005) look at age-specific cost 
development for a projection of OKP premiums, but only insofar as they undertake a straightforward extrapolation 
from the past. In addition to the drawbacks of a trend extrapolation already referred to in this section, there is also 
a risk that the age-specific effect will be overexaggerated on the basis of perpetuation of one-off, non-systematic 
cost increases in the past. 
23 For a technical illustration see Appendix  A1. 
24 From here onwards, expenditure per capita refers to expenditure per capita of the population, unless 
otherwise stated.  
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as a proportion of the population (probability of falling sick or requiring care). The latter two 
elements can in turn be summarized as the overall extent of services per capita (volume per 
capita).  
3.1 Rising life expectancy and morbidity rate 
When drawing up projections for expenditure, the correlation between the increase in life 
expectancy and developments in the state of health (morbidity rate) or the care requirement for 
the population is an important factor. 25 Very generally speaking, morbidity in this study is 
understood as an indicator of the prevalence (frequency) of illness among the population or 
among certain age groups of the population. A fall in the morbidity rate is equivalent to an 
improvement in the population’s state of health.  
 
The state of a population’s health in developed countries is largely determined by the 
prevalence of degenerative ailments such as cardiovascular disease and cancer, as well as 
chronic conditions such as diabetes, but it is virtually unaffected by infectious diseases (see 
Höpflinger et al., 2011, 34). In other words, it is conceivable that life expectancy could rise 
even for patients suffering from severe ailments, for example on the basis of good medical care. 
But this complicates the process of forecasting whether or not rising life expectancy goes hand 
in hand with a good state of health (i.e. a declining morbidity rate). There are essentially three 
competing theories that have evolved in this area (see for example Robine and Michel, 2004, 
590):26  
1. “Healthy Ageing” or “Dynamic Equilibrium” (relative compression of morbidity): This 
theory assumes that there is no change in the period of life spent suffering from a 
particular ailment or requiring care. Although an increase in chronic degenerative 
conditions is anticipated as a result of rising life expectancy, it is believed that the impact 
of these conditions will be less severe than they have been hitherto, which compensates 
for the rise in these conditions. As a consequence, the extra period of life gained is spent 
in a good state of health.  
                                                 
25 The state of health is defined in different ways (see Höpflinger et al., 2011, 34). The WHO for example uses 
the concept of “health-adjusted life expectancy”. This indicator measures the average number of years that a person 
can expect to spend in a good state of health. This involves subtracting from life expectancy those years of life 
spent in morbidity. Another indicator, namely “disability-free life expectancy”, measures the number of years of 
life that a person can expect to live free of disability. This means a person not being subject to any restrictions with 
regard to the “activities of daily life” (ADL scale) such as washing, getting dressed, shopping, etc. Above all, this 
latter indicator provides information on the level of care needed by a person, whereby this care requirement is 
frequently the consequence of multiple morbidity.  
26 On the basis of the latest data available, Robine and Michel (2004) have recently developed a dynamic theory 
which assumes that the phases of expansion and compression of morbidity actually vary.  
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2. “Compression of Morbidity” (absolute compression of morbidity): As a result of 
improved preventative measures, the frequency of chronic degenerative conditions can 
be reduced, so that the period of life spent suffering from a condition or requiring care 
is actually compressed. As a consequence, the period of life spent in good health rises 
more strongly than life expectancy.  
3. “Pure Ageing” or “Expansion of Morbidity” (expansion of morbidity): As a result of an 
increase in chronic degenerative conditions, the extra period of life gained cannot be 
spent in good health. The population’s state of health deteriorates.  
Empirical research does not provide conclusive evidence as to which theory is the most 
accurate. A comparison between different EU countries between 1995 and 2003, based on the 
disability-free life expectancy of individuals of 65 and upwards, reveals varying developments 
between different countries and between genders (see Seematter-Bagnoud et al., 2009, 19-20; 
Fn. 25). In the case of the age group of 65 and upwards in Switzerland between 1981 and 2002, 
for example, it emerges that the number of disability-free years of life for men has risen in step 
with the rise in life expectancy (“healthy ageing”), whereas for women there has actually been 
a compression in the years of life spent with disability (“compression of morbidity”). Here the 
per capita expenditure is influenced by the probability of falling ill or requiring care (number 
of patients or persons requiring care per capita) as shown in Equation (1). The correlation 
between rising life expectancy and a population’s state of health is a further demand-side factor 
alongside the ageing of the population. According to the “healthy ageing” assumption, the state 
of health of the population should improve across all age cohorts, for example. In other words, 
expenditure per capita should decline for each age cohort ceteris paribus. A decline in the 
morbidity rate of the population is reflected in the projections through a shift of the expenditure 
profile to the right (see Figure 3).  
 
Later on we will look at the relevant non-demographic cost drivers that have caused the 
expenditure profile in Figure 3 to shift upwards. 
3.2 Income effect – income elasticity 
The correlation between income and development of healthcare expenditure is incorporated 
into this study via income elasticity. Unlike in economic theory, this term is applied here not 
just on the demand side, but also on the supply effects that have an influence through income.27 
 
                                                 
27 Smith et al. (2009, 1280) therefore use the term “expenditure elasticity” instead of the term “income 
elasticity”.  
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From a theoretical standpoint, however, the income effect is actually a demand-side-effect. 
It is based on the assumption that people are prepared to spend a disproportionate amount of 
their income on healthcare products as their income increases. Healthcare services should 
accordingly be classified as an upmarket or luxury goods category. At private household level, 
this can hardly be demonstrated empirically if insurance cover is in place that weakens the 
correlation between individual budget restrictions and the demand for healthcare products, 
depending on the scope of the policy in question (see Getzen, 2000, 262-263). The budget 
restriction is therefore only binding at the level of the wider pool of insured persons when that 
pool reflects the entire population of a developed economy, as is the case in Switzerland due to 
its mandatory healthcare insurance system. Accordingly, a positive disproportionate correlation 
between overall income development in an economy and healthcare expenditure can be 
observed empirically, whereas only a weak correlation can be observed between individual 
income and healthcare expenditure (see Getzen, 2000, 266 et seq., Table 1).  
 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to distinguish empirically between the demand-side income effect 
described above and existing interdependencies between income and certain supply-side-effects 
(see Smith et al., 2009, 1280).28 The projections of this study are therefore based on the 
assumption that a number of supply-side and demand-side cost drivers can be captured through 
the income effect. These include advances in medical technology (see Section 3.3), the 
increasing demands made of the healthcare system by the population, and the demand by 
patients induced by the knowledge and information advantage of suppliers in the healthcare 
system. 
 
3.3 Advances in medical technology  
This cost driver is generally considered one of the most important – if not the most important 
– cost driver in the healthcare economy (see Smith et al. 2009, 1281). Advances in medical 
technology result in innovations which can broadly be said to lead to progress in diagnosis, 
therapy and the prevention of illnesses, as well as improvements in the organisation and 
financing of healthcare. Examples of this progress include the introduction of new medications 
and new diagnosis procedures such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in the 1970s. 
 Advances in medical technology change the conditions of production in healthcare, thus 
                                                 
28 It is often difficult for certain supply-side-effects such as advances in medical technology to be properly 
controlled in a regression. This can feed through into an overestimation of income elasticity (see Smith et al., 2009, 
1280 and Appendix A2).  
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making such advances a supply-side factor. The innovations brought about by advances in 
medical technology should lead to improved healthcare provision and an improved state of 
health of the population (see Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 6 et seq.). Furthermore, innovations 
can also lead to more cost-effective supply, while at the same time at least preserving the 
existing level of quality.  
 
If it is assumed that an innovation such as the introduction of a new therapy procedure will 
improve the quality of healthcare provision, this means first and foremost that better or more 
services will be provided per patient. At the same time, the question arises as to what 
repercussions this service enhancement will mean for costs, and therefore how costs per service 
provided will develop. This depends to no little extent on whether other healthcare services can 
be replaced by the new procedures, or whether the new procedures turn out to be 
complementary. In addition, innovations can also require healthcare staff to learn new skills, 
which in turn can lead to an additional requirement for qualified personnel. Finally, the number 
of patients can be reduced in the medium term, for example if the number of chronically ill 
persons declines as a result of more effective therapy procedures. Consequently, advances in 
medical technology can have an impact on all three expenditure per capita coefficients set out 
above (see Equation (1)). It is therefore not clear on a priori basis whether advances in medical 
technology have the effect of increasing or decreasing costs.  
 
Past experience shows that advances in medical technology have the effect of increasing 
costs, but the empirical quantification of such advances is difficult, as no satisfactory indicators 
exist (see Dybczak and Przywara, 2010, 6 et seq.). The projections in this study are therefore 
predicated on the assumption that the cost effect of advances in medical technology can be 
measured by means of total economic income development (see Section 2.2.2). This can be 
justified by the fact that close interdependencies exist between advances in medical technology 
and overall economic income (see Smith et al., 2009, 1277). It may be assumed that as a society 
grows more prosperous, demand for innovations in medicine also grows through what is known 
as the “demand pull” (see Dybczak and Przwara, 2010, 8). At the same time, increasing 
prosperity also provides society with a greater range of sales opportunities for healthcare 
products, which in turn increases the incentive to invest in research and development (the 
“supply push”). Moreover, empirical estimates for Switzerland suggest that advances in 
medical technology can be captured through income elasticity (see Appendix A2). 
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3.4 The “Baumol Effect” or Baumol’s cost disease 
This supply-side-effect implies that prices in certain labour-intensive industries such as 
healthcare rise more strongly than in other industries (Baumol, 1967). This is explained by the 
fact that relatively inelastic demand for healthcare services facilitates a level of wage increases 
that exceeds what are assumed to be low healthcare productivity advances. It is generally 
assumed that real wages in healthcare grow in line with the higher productivity advances 
generated by the wider economy. The price increase in healthcare accordingly exceeds the 
general rate of inflation by the difference between overall economic productivity advances and 
productivity advances in health care. A full Baumol Effect is deemed to exist if there are no 
productivity advances in healthcare whatsoever. The Baumol Effect therefore leads to an 
increase in the expenditure per service provided in Equation (1). The Baumol Effect has a direct 
link to advances in medical technology. For example, if productivity advances are generated 
thanks to technological innovations in healthcare, the average costs of service provision decline, 
i.e. the expenditure per service provided falls (see Equation (1)). The Baumol Effect is thus 
weakened accordingly. 
 
Where healthcare expenditure projections are concerned, a consensus appears to have 
emerged that the Baumol Effect is of particular significance in the area of long-term care 
(Oliviera-Martins et al., 2006; AWG, 2012). That said, there is some uncertainty over the extent 
to which the Baumol Effect has an impact in healthcare.29 Recent panel data analyses do not 
paint a clear picture of the relevance of the Baumol Effect in developed OECD nations, for 
example. According to analysis conducted by Hartwig (2008), the Baumol Effect can be felt 
throughout the entire healthcare system. However, as Colombier (2010) shows, Hartwig (2008) 
implicitly assumes that virtually all workers are employed in service areas of the economy 
which – like healthcare –are assumed to be unproductive. Accordingly, only a very few workers 
are employed in the productive sectors of the economy like manufacturing. This assumption 
simply does not tally with the empirical facts of OECD nations, however. Colombier (2010) 
takes this into account in his empirical analysis and shows, like Hartwig (2008), the relevance 
of the Baumol Effect for healthcare. However, the results of Colombier (2010) accord a far 
lower significance to the Baumol Effect than the results that emerge from Hartwig (2008). 
Where the Swiss healthcare system is concerned, the empirical analysis presented here accords 
virtually no relevance at all to the Baumol Effect (see Appendix A2). The results of Colombier 
                                                 
29 This is also linked to the measurability of the Baumol Effect (e.g. Hartwig, 2008). 
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(2010) in turn are compatible with the consensus mentioned above insofar as this consensus 
believes that the Baumol Effect is primarily found in the area of long-term care. The projections 
of this study therefore assume the validity of the Baumol Effect for all scenarios of LTC, in 
keeping with the aforementioned consensus and the empirical results. However, given the lack 
of cohesion in the empirical results, it cannot be ruled out that this price effect is likewise valid 
in the HeL area too, which is why it is incorporated in a specific corresponding scenario (see 
Paragraph 4.1, “Baumol scenario”).  
3.5 Scarcity of healthcare personnel 
Healthcare is considered to be a relatively labour-intensive production technology. Indeed, 
staff costs account for some 70% of all healthcare costs (see SFSO “Aktuell”, 2007, 9). 
According to estimates drawn up by the Swiss Health Observatory (Obsan), as a result of the 
ageing of both the Swiss population and healthcare staff in the hospital area, around 10% to 
16% of the current workforce of 120,000 (data as at 2006) would have to be recruited by 2030 
just to maintain the current level of care (see Jaccard-Ruedin and Weaver, 2009, 10 et seq.). In 
the area of long-term care, as many as 110,100 to 170,000 care workers would have to be 
employed to maintain this level. This is equivalent to some 140% to 210% of the current 
workforce of 80,000 care workers. Departures as a result of ageing healthcare staff will occur 
above all after 2020. Furthermore, according to population scenario A-00-2010, a general 
decline in the working-age population is expected from 2022 onward. In other words, we can 
expect to see more intense competition for ever-diminishing labour resources between industry 
sectors in Switzerland, but also increased competition with other European countries facing the 
same demographic challenges as Switzerland. If a “no policy change” scenario is assumed, i.e. 
that there will be no policy changes to the status quo regarding the overall extent of services 
provided per patient over the projection period, the scarcity of healthcare specialists could lead 
to upward pressure on wages.30 This would lead to a rise in prices, which in turn would result 
in an increase in expenditure per service (see Equation (1)).  
3.6 Cost drivers not taken into account 
Empirical studies indicate that an important role is played in healthcare expenditure by 
proximity to death (Zweifel et al., 1999). This is what underlies the thesis of a number of 
                                                 
30 A further problem in healthcare is the so-called “drop-out” phenomenon, i.e. the decision by healthcare staff 
to leave the healthcare industry as a result of work pressures, particularly in the area of long-term care (see Jaccard-
Ruedin and Weaver, 2009, 16). This has the effect of intensifying the shortage of healthcare staff. However, an 
improvement in working conditions, particularly in long-term care, can really only be achieved through an increase 
in the number of workers employed in this area, which would put additional pressure on healthcare expenditure.  
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healthcare economists that – LTC aside – the ageing of the population has virtually no impact 
on healthcare expenditure (Werblow et al., 2007). This is attributed to the fact that expenditure 
on persons who are close to death differs greatly from expenditure on those persons who will 
live a while longer. Accordingly, when costs are broken down into the costs of patients who die 
and the costs of patients who survive, the expenditure profile – which increases with age – 
flattens out (see Figures 3 and 6).  
*** Figure 6 *** 
According to this thesis, neglecting the costs of patients who die will – at the very least – 
lead to an overestimation of the importance of ageing as a cost driver. This is discussed in more 
detail below.  
 
As an example, Figure 6 illustrates outpatient per capita healthcare expenditure (excluding 
long-term care) for women in 2004, broken down by patients who die and patients who survive. 
For the age cohorts up until around 90 years of age, expenditure per deceased exceeds 
expenditure per survivor. According to the population scenarios of the SFSO, the mortality rate 
rises continuously up to 2060. If the expenditure projections are drawn up on the basis of the 
expenditure profiles illustrated in Figure 6, however, the relative weighting of death-related 
costs declines, whereas the weighting of survival costs rises across all age cohorts due to the 
declining mortality rate. For the age cohorts in which expenditure per deceased exceeds 
expenditure per survivor, per capita expenditure declines. This effect cannot be captured in 
projections that do not make a distinction between death-related costs and survival-related 
costs. Observers who point out the relevance of death-related costs therefore argue that 
projections which do not take into account proximity to death systematically overestimate the 
costs of ageing. However, this argument in turn overlooks the fact that a counter-effect exists 
which has the effect of increasing expenditure per capita (see Colombier and Weber, 2011, 254 
et seq.). This results from the fact that death-related expenditure works out lower than survival-
related expenditure for the higher age cohorts (see Figure 6).31 It can therefore not be stated on 
a priori basis whether neglecting death-related costs systematically results in an overestimation 
or an underestimation of expenditure per capita. Furthermore, the results from the initial 
expenditure projections from 2008 show that the increase in the expenditure rise for the “Death-
related costs” scenario is just 0.1% of GDP lower than the “Reference scenario”, which is 
virtually negligible (see Colombier and Weber, 2008, 52, Table A3). The same conclusion, 
                                                 
31 It should also been taken into account that the mortality rate in the SFSO population scenario declines more 
strongly for the high age cohorts than it does for the low ones.  
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albeit with a different methodology, is arrived at by Steimann et al. (2005), who likewise project 
healthcare expenditure taking into account death-related costs. Moreover, as the work involved 
in drawing up a death-related costs scenario is extremely onerous and time-consuming, and as 
no official data exists on death-related costs in Switzerland, after weighing the costs and 
benefits a decision was taken not to elaborate such a scenario again.  
 
It is apparent that social trends can continue to influence the way healthcare expenditure 
develops over time. In particular, clear evidence has emerged of a shift from looking after those 
requiring care in a family environment to more formal solutions (“Spitex” and care homes). 
The rise of the latter is attributed to the changing status of women in professional life (increasing 
female labour participation rate) and changed family structures, and could result in additional 
pressures on expenditure in the area of long-term care for those aged 65 and upwards. However, 
there is not yet any robust data that allows for a precise evaluation of the extent of this effect. 
For example, if the development of the female labour participation rate alone were to be 
considered the driver of this trend, the pressure on costs ought (at least) not to rise. According 
to the demographic scenario A-00-2010, the female labour participation rate  (in FTEs) is 
expected to decline from just under 38% in 2009 to 36% in 2060. There is therefore uncertainty 
not just over the extent of this trend, but the evidence for it in the first place. Due to these 
relatively problematic imponderables, this trend is not taken into account in these scenarios.32 
Instead, the current division between formal and informal LTC is extrapolated in the 
projections. For the same reason, trends possibly evident in the past which lead to a shift in 
costs between various areas of healthcare, such as the inpatient and outpatient areas, are not 
extrapolated. On the other hand, the current projections do facilitate an illustration of how 
strongly the inpatient and outpatient areas influence the development of expenditure in their 
different ways. This in turn allows conclusions to be drawn as to what impact a structural shift 
has on the cost dynamics.  
4 Scenarios for healthcare 
As already mentioned in Section 2.1, it is unclear how precisely the above-mentioned cost 
drivers have an impact on healthcare expenditure. This uncertainty is taken into account through 
the elaboration of a number of different scenarios. With the help of these different scenarios, 
                                                 
32 In the initial expenditure projections of 2008, a “Trend towards formal care” was calculated, in which it was 
assumed that expenditure between 2010 and 2020 would grow 10% more strongly overall than in the “Reference 
scenario” (see Colombier and Weber, 2008, 36 et seq.). Accordingly, the rise of expenditure works out 0.3% of 
GDP higher than in the “Reference scenario”.  
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the extent to which healthcare expenditure reacts to individual cost drivers can also be 
established. In the status quo scenarios, it is assumed that the statutory parameters currently in 
place will not change during the projection timeframe (“no policy change”). In addition, so-
called efficiency scenarios are drawn up which are designed – in contrast to the status quo 
scenarios – to illustrate the effects of health policy measures. These are examined in Section 8. 
4.1 Healthcare excluding long-term care 
The paragraphs below explain the scenarios drawn up for the area of healthcare excluding 
long-term care (HeL). Table 4 provides a summary overview of this respect. 
*** Table 4 *** 
Reference scenario: For the projection of expenditure, the SFSO’s medium base scenario 
A-00-2010 is assumed.  As there is no dominant theory discernible regarding the correlation 
between rising life expectancy of the population and its state of health, a compromise is 
assumed whereby the population spends half of the extra period of life gained in good health. 
On the basis of the results of the empirical estimates, it is assumed that expenditure rises 
slightly disproportionately to cyclically-adjusted GDP (income elasticity of 1.1) (see 
Appendix A2). Here it is assumed that both demand-side (healthcare as a form of luxury 
goods) and supply-side cost drivers such as advances in medical technology are to be taken 
into account (see Section 3.2). In keeping with the standard international approach, no 
Baumol Effect is taken into account in the “Reference scenario” for HeL.  
Pure ageing: In contrast to the “Reference scenario”, it is assumed that the population 
spends the extra years of life gained in ill health (expansion of morbidity). 
Healthy ageing: Unlike the “Reference scenario”, it is assumed that the population spends 
the extra years of life gained in good health (relative compression of morbidity). 
Compression of morbidity: Unlike the “Reference scenario”, it is assumed that the 
population spends 1.5 times the extra period of life gained in good health (absolute 
compression of morbidity). 
Migration: In contrast to the “Reference scenario”, population scenario A-17-2010 is 
assumed. This hypothesises that net immigration in Switzerland works out higher than the 
medium base scenario A-00-2010 (see Table 1).  
Wage pressure: With the expected decline in the working-age population from around 2020, 
the shortage of personnel in healthcare becomes more acute, which leads to pressures on 
wages in the healthcare industry. It is assumed that healthcare wages rise by 1.2 times the 
average annual increase in wages from 2020 onwards. 
Baumol: In contrast to the “Reference scenario”, it is assumed that the Baumol Effect has a 
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25% impact. As the wages of healthcare personnel grow in line with the remaining economy, 
and productivity advances in the HeL area are a quarter slower than in the overall economy, 
the prices of HeL services rise 25% more strongly that the general level of prices. 
EU: To improve comparability with the projections of the EU, it is assumed that income 
elasticity over the project timeframe converges towards one, as per the “Reference scenario” 
of the EU itself.33  
 
4.2 Long-time care from the age of 65 
The paragraphs below explain the scenarios for the area of LTC. Table 5 provides a summary 
overview. It is implicitly assumed in these scenarios that the current share of informal (i.e. 
unpaid for) care remains constant (see Section 3.6). 
*** Table 5 *** 
Reference scenario: This scenario assumes a correlation between rising life expectancy and 
the care requirement of the population from the age of 65 and upwards. It is assumed that the 
population spends half the extra years of life gained without requiring care. The Baumol Effect 
is felt in full, but macroeconomic income developments have no impact on care expenditure. 
The assumptions of the Pure ageing, Healthy ageing, Compression of morbidity and 
Migration scenarios, which are otherwise based on the “Reference scenario”, vary in 
accordance with the scenarios for HeL. In the Wage pressure scenario, it is assumed that wages 
in the healthcare industry rise by 1.3 times the overall economic average from 2020 onwards. 
This level of wage growth is higher than for HeL, as the assumption that external parameters 
are unlikely to change in turn means that the long-term care area suffers particularly acutely 
from a shortage of personnel (see Section 3.5).   
                                                 
33 This was also the underlying assumption of the “Reference scenario” of the expenditure predictions up to 
2050 (see Colombier and Weber, 2008, 15).  
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5 Total healthcare expenditure  
The expenditure projections reveal that the ageing of the population leads to a clear rise in 
total healthcare expenditure, irrespective of the scenario (see Table 6).  
*** Table 6 *** 
This means an additional financial burden for public sector budgets, the OKP and private 
individuals.34 In the “Reference scenario”, expenditure rises from 11.3% of (cyclically-
adjusted) GDP in the base year of 2009 to 15.8% of GDP in 2060. In each case, half of this rise 
in expenditure is attributable to demographic developments, the other half to non-demographic 
influence factors such as rising demand for healthcare services, advances in medical 
technology, and wage costs (Baumol Effect). 
 
The alternative scenarios to the “Reference scenario” show that changes in the morbidity 
rate and wage costs have a significant impact on the development of healthcare expenditure. 
“Compression of morbidity” is therefore the most optimistic scenario. Here it is assumed that 
the period of life spent in an ill state of health will be compressed as life expectancy increases.  
*** Figure 7 *** 
The most pessimistic scenario is the “Wage pressure” scenario (see Figure 7). Both the 
“Compression of morbidity” scenario and the “Wage pressure” scenario deviate significantly 
from the projected expenditure development of the “Reference scenario”, in the former case by 
40% (-2.0% of GDP), and in the latter case by 30% (+4.5% of GDP). By contrast, the 
“Migration” scenario – which assumes that average annual net immigration will be higher by 
some 20,000 people – leads to a moderate cost saving of just under 10% (-0.4% of GDP) 
compared to the expenditure projections of the “Reference scenario”  (see Table 6). This 
development is attributable to the greater dynamism of GDP development. However, this effect 
is largely offset by the fact that healthcare expenditure increases more strongly in line with the 
assumption of faster-growing incomes. The difference to the “Reference scenario” is even 
smaller (at -0.3% of GDP) if a convergent development of income and the income-driven 
component of healthcare expenditure is assumed, instead of a constant income elasticity of 1.1 
as per the “EU” scenario.  
 
The pressure of demographic developments weighs in particular on expenditure in the area 
of long-term care. Whereas in the “Reference scenario” for the LTC area, around 70% of the 
                                                 
34 For a more detailed overview of the results of the “Reference scenario” see table appendix, Table A1. 
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rise in expenditure is accounted for by demographic developments, the equivalent figure for 
HeL is much lower at 40%. As a result, the proportion of expenditure on long-term care in the 
“Reference scenario” rises to about 27% of overall expenditure by 2060, virtually double the 
level of around 14% in the base year. By contrast, the proportion of expenditure on healthcare 
excluding long-term care declines from 85% to 72% over the same timeframe.  
***Figure 8 *** 
Together with the new arrangements for the financing of care (see also Section 4.2), which 
entered into force on 1 January 2011 and involve the share in the financing costs of the OKP 
and private households being capped, growth in long-term care requirements is likely to place 
an additional burden on the cantons and communes. According to Figure 8, the financing share 
of all healthcare expenditure met by the public sector will rise from 31% in 2009 to 35% in 
2060, whereas the shares of the OKP and private households will remain virtually constant at 
29% and 25% respectively. 35  
*** Figure 9 *** 
Despite this constant financing share, the OKP and private households will nonetheless have 
to bear a tangible additional financing burden, namely +1.3% and +1.2% of GDP respectively. 
The share of the remaining sources of financing, which include compulsory accident insurance 
(SUVA; financing proportion in 2009: 3%) and supplementary insurance, would be lower in 
2060 than in the base year. The strong rise in public sector costs at the beginning of the 
projection timeframe is attributable to reforms in the financing of care and hospitals (see Section 
6). The OKP is likewise affected by the new hospital financing regime (see Section 7). 
5.1 Healthcare excluding long-term care 
The HeL comprises expenditure on inpatient treatment in hospitals (including psychiatric 
clinics), outpatient treatment (in doctors’ surgeries and hospitals, as well as physiotherapy and 
psychotherapy), medications, therapeutic equipment, dental treatment, administration, 
prevention and other services such as laboratory, transport and rescue services.36 The 
expenditure on administration, prevention and other services, which accounted for some 20% 
of HeL expenditure in the base year of 2009, is extrapolated in line with GDP, as these areas 
are not exposed to the same cost drivers as other areas of healthcare (see Figure 2). For 
                                                 
35 The expenditure of the OKP is adjusted by the cost participation of the insured and the expenditure on IPR. The latter 
cost is borne by the cantons.  
36 It should be pointed out here that expenditure on institutions for the disabled, addicts, and people with psychosocial 
problems are assigned to the area of healthcare excluding long-term care. This expenditure includes expenditure on long-term 
care for people below 65 years of age, short-term care, and medical services, which makes clear classification more problematic. 
In 2009 this amounted to 0.5% of GDP. 
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simplicity’s sake, the same approach is taken with expenditure on dental care, as this has 
virtually no impact on public sector expenditure.  
*** Table 7 *** 
According to the “Reference scenario”, HeL expenditure rises from 9.5% of GDP in 2009 
to 11.4% of GDP in 2060 (see Table 7). The expenditure for inpatient treatment in hospitals 
rises at a different rate to outpatient treatment as a result of different expenditure profiles in the 
base year (see Section 2.1, Figures 4a and 4c). Expenditure for outpatient treatment rises from 
4.4% to 5.2% of GDP over the observed timeframe. Expenditure for hospitals rises by 1.0% of 
GDP, from 3.2% in 2009 to 4.2% of GDP in 2060. This means that the growth in expenditure 
is rather higher for hospitals than it is for outpatient treatment. The former rose by a nominal 
annual average of 3.2%, compared to a rise of 2.8% for the latter. This means that the relative 
significance of hospital expenditure rises from 28% in 2009 to 37% in 2060. The proportion of 
expenditure accounted for by outpatient treatment remains at around 46%. There is a decline in 
the relative weighting of remaining healthcare expenditure, such as for administration and 
prevention.  
 
The expenditure dynamic differs sharply from the “Reference scenario” above all as a result 
of wage costs and a change in morbidity caused by increasing life expectancy.  
*** Figures 10a and 10b *** 
If it is assumed that the growth in productivity advances in HeL is ¼ lower than the overall 
economic average, and the Baumol Effect plays a partial role, expenditure is 1.3% of GDP (or 
70%) higher than in the “Reference scenario” (see also Figure 10b). The strong price pressure 
that can result from wage cost developments is likewise documented by the “Wage pressure” 
scenario. In this scenario it is assumed that healthcare wages will rise at an above-average rate 
as a result of a potential shortage of personnel from 2020 onward. At 2.6% of GDP, the rise in 
expenditure is significantly higher than the growth of 1.8% of GDP in the “Reference scenario”.  
 
An almost equally large reduction in the rise in expenditure results if it is assumed that the 
population’s state of health improves much more sharply than is assumed in the “Reference 
scenario” (see Figure 10a). In the “Compression of morbidity” scenario, the rise of expenditure 
would work out 0.9% of GDP (or 50%) lower than in the “Reference scenario”. If the 
population’s increase in life expectancy does not result in any improvement in the general state 
of health, however, as is assumed in the “Pure ageing” scenario, there is an increase in 
expenditure of 0.5% of GDP or just under 30%. As is the case with overall expenditure, there 
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is virtually no change in expenditure development in the “Migration” and “EU” scenarios 
compared to the “Reference scenario” (see Section 5). However, the result of the EU scenario 
does allow us to conclude that the income elasticity assumption has little impact on expenditure 
development. The difference between the constant income elasticity of 1.1 assumed in the 
“Reference scenario” and the income elasticity converging towards one between 2009 and 2060 
is minimal. The assumption of higher income elasticity, for example as a result of greater cost 
pressures through advances in medical technology, is likely to accelerate the expenditure 
equally sharply. 
 
An analysis of expenditure development in Figures 10a and 10b shows that the rise in 
expenditure in most scenarios slows from around the mid-2030s onwards. This is explained by 
the fact that demographic pressures recede sharply according to the applied demographic 
scenario A-00-2010, as the baby boomer generation born between the end of the 1940s and the 
middle of the 1960s gradually dies out. Accordingly, there is also a slowdown in the increase 
in the old-age dependency ratio – measured as the population aged 65 and over as a proportion 
of the working population aged between 20 and 64 in full-time equivalents (FTE) – of ¾ of a 
percent per year in the period 2036- 2060 compared to the period 2009-2035. This development 
is particularly evident in the EU scenario, as here it is assumed that the pressure of non-
demographic cost drivers will also recede. As a result, the highest level of expenditure of 11.2% 
of GDP will be reached in 2053, before this rate declines to 11.1% of GDP by 2060.  
*** Figure 11 *** 
The breakdown of the price-adjusted rise in expenditure after the contribution of the various 
cost drivers reveals that income development and ageing (including population growth) are the 
most important factors (see Figure 11). For example, income development accounts for 55% 
and ageing 51% of the price-adjusted rise in expenditure in the “Reference scenario” between 
2009 and 2060. In contrast to the “Pure ageing” scenario, however, only part of the effect of 
ageing in the “Reference scenario” is offset by the fact that the population’s state of health 
improves as life expectancy rises, reducing the explanatory contribution of the demographic 
cost drivers (ageing plus morbidity) by 7%. In the “Compression of morbidity” scenario, the 
decline in the morbidity rate reduces the demographic cost contribution by as much as 23%. 
Accordingly, the contribution of the demographic cost drivers to the rise in expenditure is just 
25% in the “Compression of morbidity” scenario, significantly lower than in the “Pure ageing” 
scenario (49%). An increase in wage costs, be it as a result of the Baumol Effect or due to a 
shortage in healthcare personnel, likewise has a sharp impact on the extent of the cost increase. 
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One striking aspect is that the significance of ageing as a cost driver increases in line with higher 
immigration. This is attributable to the fact that higher net immigration results in a rise in 
demand for healthcare services.  
5.2 Long-term care from the age of 65 
The expenditure for LTC also includes expenditure on inpatient services in care homes and 
the outpatient services of external care services (Spitex). It should be recalled that the definition 
of long-term care applied here relates solely to expenditure for persons aged 65 and upwards. 
 
As mentioned in Section 5, the LTC area is more strongly affected by the ageing of society 
than other areas of healthcare. The ageing of the generation born between the end of the 1940s 
and the middle of the 1960s (baby boomer generation) and a further increase in life expectancy 
will lead to strong growth in the age cohorts above 80 over the next few decades. This in turn 
will mean an average annual growth rate of 4.6% per year (nominal) in expenditure on LTC, 
which is far greater than the growth in HeL expenditure. The annual average nominal growth 
rate for the latter amounts to just under 3.0%. Overall, expenditure on LTC in the base year of 
2009 amounts to some 1.5% of GDP. In the “Reference scenario”, this expenditure rises to 
4.3% of GDP by 2060, which is almost equivalent to a tripling of expenditure in the LTC area 
(see Table 8).  
*** Table 8 *** 
A breakdown of costs between care homes and Spitex shows that the increase in expenditure 
on the former is the primary driver of cost growth. However, the development of costs is very 
strong in both areas: Expenditure on Spitex undergoes a 2.5-fold rise from 0.2% to 0.5% of 
GDP, while that on care homes virtually triples from 1.3% to 3.8% of GDP. In other words, the 
already high proportion of expenditure accounted for by care homes, which currently stands at 
just under 87%, rises by a further 1.5 percentage points. 
The cost-driving impact of demographics on LTC expenditure is further accentuated by 
wage cost development: As already mentioned, the LTC scenarios assume that no productivity 
gains are achieved and that the Baumol Effect is therefore felt in full. This means that the LTC 
area experiences cost growth caused by the wages of healthcare staff rising in step with wage 
levels in the remainder of the economy, despite lower rationalisation potential.  
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*** Figure 12 *** 
Depending on the scenario, between 30% (“Pure ageing”) and 41% (“Compression of 
morbidity”) of the price-adjusted rise in expenditure between 2009 and 2060 can be explained 
by the Baumol Effect (see Figure 12). Ageing and the morbidity rate have a strong impact on 
LTC, just as they do on HeL. As in the “Compression of morbidity” scenario, ageing can explain 
up to 94% of the price-adjusted rise in expenditure by 2060. The “Pure ageing” scenario aside, 
however, the cost-driving ageing effect is partially offset in all scenarios by a decline in the 
requirement for care. In the case of the “Compression of morbidity” scenario, the explanatory 
contribution of the demographic cost drivers (ageing plus morbidity) therefore amounts to 59%, 
rather lower than the 69% that applies in the “Pure ageing” scenario. The sensitivity with which 
expenditure on LTC (as a proportion of GDP) reacts to changes in the care requirement 
assumption is explained below. 
*** Figure 13 *** 
The change in the extent of care requirements (morbidity rate) is one of the greatest levers 
for influencing expenditure development in the long-term care area (see Figure 13). For 
example, the rise in expenditure on long-term care by 2060 is at its lowest in the “Compression 
of morbidity” scenario (+1.6% of GDP to 3.2% of GDP), whereas it is at its highest in the “Pure 
ageing” scenario (+3.4% of GDP to 4.9% of GDP). A similarly strong impact on long-term care 
expenditure (“Wage pressure” scenario: +3.3% of GDP to 4.8% of GDP by 2060) is the 
accelerated increase in real wages, which could be triggered by a shortage of specialist care 
staff. By contrast, a higher net immigration rate (“Migration” scenario) does little to bring down 
the rise in expenditure compared to the “Reference scenario” (difference: -0.2% of GDP). 
6 Public healthcare expenditure 
Public healthcare expenditure includes all contributions made by the Confederation, cantons, 
communes and social security funds to the financing of healthcare. In the case of the former 
three levels of government, all expenditure which appears in the government finance statistics 
under the “Health” function is included. Also included are government transfers to private 
households for the purposes of financing healthcare benefits, such as individual premium 
reduction (IPR) and supplementary cantonal services to AHV (EL AHV). Where the social 
security funds are concerned, the relevant areas are those which make payments to the 
government sector and receive payments from the government as per the national accounts. 
This essentially limits the funds in question to AHV and IV. Just as in the case of overall 
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expenditure, public expenditure on healthcare is likewise broken down into the HeL and LTC 
areas (see Figure 2). Section 6.1 and 6.2 explore these areas in more detail. As the expenditure 
of IV affects the financing of long-term care for people under 65 years of age, the contributions 
of IV to healthcare are extrapolated in line with the expenditure development projections for 
IV in the context of the long-term outlook for the public finances (Geier and Zahno, 2012). 
Other contributions to healthcare by the public sector, such as those for prevention and 
administration, are extrapolated in line with GDP.  
 
The first thing to be borne in mind where the projections for public healthcare expenditure 
are concerned is the fact that two special effects have an impact on the years up to 2013. These 
relate to the introduction of the new arrangement of care financing at the new hospital financing 
regime (see Federal Act on the New Arrangement for Care Financing of June 1, 2008; Section 
8.1). As a result of the new arrangement for care financing, the proportion of care costs borne 
by the public sector is due to rise from 2011 onwards. According to these projections, which 
are based on the estimates of the Federal Office of Public Health for the repercussions of care 
financing, this will lead to a one-off increase of just under 0.1% of GDP in the proportion of 
financing to be borne by the public sector. In addition, it should be observed that the 
introduction of the new hospital financing regime from 1 January 2012 prescribes a new 
financing ratio for inpatient services between the cantons and the OKP (55% to 45%), the 
overall result of which will be to impose an additional burden not only on the cantons but also 
on the OKP, and therefore ultimately on the public sector (FFA, 2010). For the purposes of the 
projections, it is assumed (on the basis of an estimate by the Federal Office of Public Health) 
that cantonal expenditure will rise by just under 0.2% of GDP in 2012.  
*** Figure 14 *** 
The steep rise in public healthcare expenditure between 2009 and 2013 which is apparent in 
Figure 14 is primarily attributable to these special effects. 
*** Table 9 *** 
In the “Reference scenario”, the public expenditure which encompasses the expenditure of 
the three levels of government as well as the AHV and IV fund contributions to healthcare rises 
from 3.5% of GDP to 5.6% of GDP (see Table 9). The AHV and IV contributions include 
expenditure on the helplessness allowance, medical services and therapeutic equipment, for 
example. As the projections for public expenditure are based on the projections for overall 
healthcare expenditure, the same cost drivers predominate. Just like total healthcare 
expenditure, government expenditure reacts most sensitively to a change in the state of the 
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population’s health (“Compression of morbidity”: increase in expenditure of 1.3% of GDP) and 
a disproportional development in healthcare wage costs (“Wage pressure”: increasing 
expenditure of 2.6% of GDP) (see Figure 14).  
*** Table 10 *** 
If public expenditure is broken down by government level and social security fund, it 
emerges that the cantons provide the lion’s share of the financing of public healthcare 
expenditure in the base year, namely 66%, which equates to 2.3% of GDP (see Table 10). This 
is particularly attributable to the cantonal contributions to hospitals, which account for just 
under 60% of all cantonal expenditure on healthcare. Accordingly, the rise in expenditure is 
most keenly felt by the cantons at 1.7% of GDP. This development reflects the current 
breakdown of tasks between the Confederation and the cantons in the area of healthcare and 
hospital policy, as well as in the financing of care services. By contrast, the greatest cost 
dynamism is evident in the case of the communes, whose expenditure doubles from 0.3% to 
0.6% when measured as a proportion of GDP. This is primarily driven by the surge in 
expenditure on long-term care (see Section 4.2). At 0.1% of GDP, the rise in federal expenditure 
up to 2060 turns out to be comparatively modest. This is almost exclusively driven by 
expenditure on IPR. Where the social security funds are concerned, the additional burden of the 
AHV helplessness allowance – which is due to expenditure growth in the care area – is almost 
wholly compensated for by a fall in IV contributions for the care of persons under 65 years of 
age. Among other things, the latter is explained by the anticipated decline in the working 
population from 2020 onwards. Overall, this leads to a shift in the proportions of public 
healthcare financing to the detriment of the cantons and the communes. Their combined share 
rises from 75% in 2009 to 80% in 2060, with 80% of this increase borne by the cantons. This 
too is a consequence of the changes approved by the Swiss parliament in hospital and care 
financing, with the corresponding additional burdens borne by the state and in particular by the 
cantons. These changes took effect in 2011. 
*** Figure 15 *** 
A breakdown of tasks by function shows that the financing of public hospitals currently 
accounts for the largest proportion of public sector expenditure at 42% (see Figure 15). The 
financing of IPR accounts for the second-highest proportion of public expenditure (18%). 
However, the projections show that expenditure on these two functions, which are counted 
under HeL in the current projections, decline in the “Reference scenario” from a 54% share in 
the base year to 45% in 2060. This is attributable to the fact that the proportion of financing 
accounted for by functions in the LTC area rises from 17% in the base year to 33% in 2060, as 
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a the result of a strong surge in costs in the LTC area and the new arrangement for the financing 
of care.37 As a result of the reform of care financing, government contributions to care homes 
rise particularly strongly in proportion to other expenditure on LTC, namely from 4% to 13%. 
Other expenditure on LTC includes contributions to Spitex, supplementary benefits 
contributions for the AHV to LTC (EL-AHV) and the AHV helplessness allowance (AHV-
HE). Finally, expenditure on the IV helplessness allowance (IV-HE) and IV(AHV) 
contributions to healthcare services will weigh less heavily on public finances. 
6.1 Healthcare excluding long-term care 
Public healthcare expenditure excluding long-term care includes the expenditure functions 
listed in the government finance statistics under the “Health” function, with the exception of 
the “Nursing and care homes” and “Outpatient nursing care” positions (FFA, 2011). In addition, 
expenditure on IPR, which is classified in the government finance statistics under the “Social 
welfare”, function, is also taken into account. The inclusion of IPR is justified on the basis that 
expenditure on IPR is strongly influenced by healthcare expenditure, particularly healthcare 
expenditure excluding long-term care. For the sake of simplicity, expenditure on IPR is 
subsumed under government healthcare expenditure. According to this demarcation, public 
sector healthcare expenditure comprises the three positions of hospitals, expenditure on IPR, 
and other healthcare expenditure such as prevention expenditure (see also Section 6). 
 
Where the expenditure projections are concerned, the government finance statistics data is also 
taken into account for the base year of 2009, as are (for federal expenditure) the figures of the 
Legislature Financial Plan 2013-15 (see FFA, 2011; FC, 2012; Appendix A3, Table A3).  Here 
it is assumed that the proportion of cantonal expenditure on IPR, which currently amounts to 
around 45%, will rise to 50% in the longer term. In other words, the Confederation and the 
cantons will each contribute a half share to the IPR. In addition, it is assumed for simplicity’s 
sake that the number of inhabitants benefiting from IPR as a proportion of the Swiss population 
will not change. This assumption is made as the cantons have considerable discretionary 
freedom of manoeuvre when it comes to the allocation criteria for IPR benefits, which makes a 
reliable forecast of a number of IPR beneficiaries virtually impossible. A rough calculation 
based on the assumption of a uniform social objective on the part of all cantons, whereby the 
premium burden should not exceed 8% of the gross income of a household, reveals that the 
                                                 
37 Strictly speaking the proportion of expenditure accounted for by LTC is rather higher still, as a proportion 
of care is financed via the IPR. If this is taken into account, the LTC share of GDP rises from 19.5% to 36.5% in 
the “Reference scenario”.   
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increase in the number of IPR beneficiaries over a period of 45 years would result in an 
additional increase in expenditure on IPR of 0.1 percentage points of GDP (see FC, 2008, 
Appendix 7, Box 3). Accordingly, taking into account a change in the number of IPR 
beneficiaries would barely affect overall public healthcare expenditure.  
 
Public expenditure on hospitals is linked to the development in overall hospital expenditure, 
while other healthcare expenditure is linked to the development of nominal GDP (see Figure 
2). The development of expenditure on IPR is dependent on the expenditure dynamics of the 
OKP. This means that expenditure on the OKP has to be projected first (see Section 7). The 
OKP finances not only benefits in the HeL area but also those in the LTC area, with the former 
currently accounting for the lion’s share of services at roughly 90%. In addition, the proportion 
of care costs accounted for by the OKP has been capped following the introduction of the new 
arrangement for care financing (see Section 6.2). For the expenditure projections of the OKP 
and IPR, the scenarios for HeL and LTC have to be combined (see Section 7, Table 15).  
 
All three public sector expenditure positions are projected with different dynamic growth rates, 
which means that the expenditure structure of the base year may shift by 2060. Another aspect 
to be taken into account where the projections are concerned is the fact that the introduction of 
the new hospital financing regime (which entered into force on 1 January 2009) envisages a 
new financing split between the cantons and the OKP from 2012 onwards.38 According to this 
regime, the cantons should bear a maximum of 55% of the costs of inpatient services, while the 
insured should pay a maximum of 45% (Art. 49a Para. 2 HIA). An extra cost burden for the 
OKP and a corresponding alleviation of the burden of the cantons occurs due to the investment 
costs of public hospitals and publicly subsidised hospitals, which are now taken over by the 
OKP as a result of the introduction of flat-rate payments per case (Swiss DRG). With the 
introduction of free choice of hospital throughout Switzerland (Art. 41. Para. 1(new) HIA), 
additional burdens are incurred by the cantons, whereas the inclusion of additional private 
hospitals in the hospital lists and the takeover of the HIA costs of private hospitals by private 
supplementary insurance results in a cost burden for both the cantons and the OKP. On the basis 
of estimates drawn up by the Federal Office of Public Health for the repercussions on the 
budgets of the cantons and the OKP, a one-off increase in cantonal expenditure on hospitals of 
CHF +1 billion is assumed for 2012. The equivalent figure for the OKP is CHF + 0.5 billion.  
*** Table 11 *** 
                                                 
38 For a detailed explanation see FFA (2010). 
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The projections show that cost pressures are greater for the public finances than they are for 
the remaining areas of HeL. Within the public finances, it is the cantons that are the most 
affected. In the “Reference scenario”, government expenditure rises by just under 40% between 
2009 and 2060, from 2.5% of GDP to 3.5% of GDP (see Table 11). The biggest single 
contributor to this increase is the area of contributions to hospitals, which are primarily financed 
by the cantons (just under +0.7% of GDP). A small proportion of some 6% of hospital 
expenditure is financed by the communes. A smaller proportion of this increase (+0.3% of 
GDP) is accounted for by the IPR, the expenditure on which is assumed to be met by the 
Confederation and the cantons in equal proportions. It should be borne in mind that the 
underlying development in expenditure on the OKP, which is what underlies the IPR 
projections, is also influenced by the higher growth in expenditure in the area of long-term care 
described above.  
 
With both income development and demographic developments shaping the development of 
government expenditure, a change in the population’s state of health (morbidity) and 
disproportionate wage developments in the healthcare industry both have a strong impact (see 
Table 11). For example, the rise in expenditure by 2060 is 0.2% of GDP higher in the “Pure 
ageing” scenarios than it is in the “Reference scenario”. In the two wage cost scenarios, namely 
“Wage pressure” and “Baumol”, expenditure by 2060 exceeds that of the “Reference scenario” 
by as much as 0.3% of GDP and 0.4% of GDP respectively. This dynamic growth in 
government expenditure could be limited if – as assumed in the “Compression of morbidity” 
scenario – the state of the population’s health were to improve sharply in line with the increase 
in life expectancy (difference to “Reference scenario”: -0.3% of GDP). This is particularly 
evident in the area of hospital expenditure. As the same factors are at work for both public 
expenditure and overall expenditure, the higher net immigration rate hypothesised in the 
“Migration” scenario has virtually no impact where public expenditure is concerned (see 
Section 6). The sensitivity of expenditure development to gradually converging income 
elasticity over the projection period (1.1 to 1.0) is likewise very low. This explains why the rise 
in expenditure in the EU scenario is just 0.05% of GDP lower than the rate of growth in the 
“Reference scenario”.  
*** Table 12 *** 
The level of state expenditure as a proportion of GDP rises twice as strongly as the proportion 
of expenditure for the entire HeL area, namely 40% compared to 19% (see Table 12). On the 
one hand, this is attributable to the fact that hospital financing (60%) accounts for almost twice 
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as high a proportion of public expenditure as it does in overall healthcare. At the moment, 
hospital financing accounts for around a third of healthcare expenditure. As nominal hospital 
expenditure, which is exhibiting an average annual growth of some 3.0%, is growing more 
strongly than expenditure on inpatient treatment (just under 2.9%), the cost pressure is felt more 
keenly in the public sector. In addition, a one-off additional burden for the cantons arises as a 
result of the new hospital financing regime (see above). At the moment, around three quarters 
of government expenditure is borne by the cantons, and the projections do not envisage this 
changing even by 2060, as the strongest cost pressure in the HeL area is felt at cantonal level 
(see Figure 16).  
*** Figure 16 *** 
The burden on cantonal finances is heavily influenced by the development of wage costs and 
morbidity (see Figure 16). For example, the increase in expenditure as a result of an 
improvement in the population’s state of health assumed in the “Compression of morbidity” 
scenario result works out as 0.3% of GDP lower than in the “Reference scenario”, which is 
equivalent to a reduction of one third in percentage terms. If part of the HeL area were to suffer 
from Baumol’s cost disease, the financial burden on the cantons would rise by the same amount. 
By way of comparison, the sensitivity of the expenditure of the Confederation and the 
communes to a change in the assumptions of the “Reference scenario” is low at a maximum of 
just under 0.1% of GDP (“Baumol” scenario).  
6.2 Long-term care from the age of 65  
According to the government finance statistics, public expenditure in the LTC area 
comprises the proportion of the expenditure of the cantons and communes allocated to nursing 
and care homes, as well as expenditure on outpatient nursing care (Spitex) provided to 
individuals aged 65 and upwards (FFA, 2011). Here it is assumed that the proportion of public 
expenditure accounted for by the age group of 65 and upwards is the same as that for overall 
care. According to our estimates, this currently amounts to just under 90% of expenditure on 
overall long-term care. Public expenditure on LTC also includes a proportion of cantonal 
supplementary benefits for the AHV (EL AHV), which is assigned to the “Social security” 
function in the government finance statistics, and the helplessness allowance of the AHV.  
 
This legislation for the new arrangement of care financing, which was passed in June 2008 
has led to a new division in the financing of long-term care between private households, the 
OKP, and the state (Federal Act on the New Arrangement for Care Financing of June 1, 2008). 
Among other objectives, this new arrangement of care financing, which entered into force on 1 
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January 2011, seeks to prevent the burden of care costs on the OKP from exceeding its current 
level of just under 21% (see FC, 2005, 19). Furthermore, where the financing of care costs is 
concerned, the proportion of persons requiring care should amount to a maximum of 20% of 
the care contribution of the OKP laid down by the Federal Council (see Art. 25a Para. 5 HIA). 
The remaining financing care costs are regulated by the cantons, which have the discretion to 
reduce the contribution met by the persons requiring care themselves (see Art. 25a Para. 5 HIA). 
As well as this additional burden on cantonal budgets, which may – depending on the cantonal 
resolution in question – also affect the communes, the introduction of a lesser degree of 
helplessness for the AHV and an increase in the exempt amount for the EL AHV will lead to 
further additional burdens to the cantons.  
 
At the time the projections were drawn up, there was still no data available as to how the 
new arrangements for care financing would affect the breakdown of costs between the sources 
of financing. These projections therefore rely on an estimation for the year 2002 produced by 
the FOPH for this purpose. According to the FOPH estimates, under the new care financing 
arrangement the public sector would have had to cover 38.6% of the costs of care homes in 
2002 rather than 32.5%, with the remaining 61.4% met by the OKP (19.9%), private households 
(40%), and other private financing sources (1.6%). The proportion met by the public sector 
breaks down into 12.0% for supplementary benefits to the AHV, 6.4% for the AHV 
helplessness allowance, 18.5% for contributions of the cantons and communes, and 1.7% for 
social welfare. Where the financing of care in the home (Spitex) is concerned, the public sector 
would account for a share of 64.4% rather than 63.7% (contributions of OKP 25.3%, AHV 
14.9%, cantons and communes 49.3%, social welfare 0.2%, private households 0.4%, other 
private financing sources 7.1%, accident insurance 1.3%). According to the FOPH estimates, 
the new arrangement for care financing will lead to the overall share of costs in the area of long-
term care borne by the public sector rising from around a third to a good 40%.  
 
The FOPH estimates form the basis for the expenditure projections from 2011 onwards. Also 
taken into account here is the change in the financing proportions of the cantons, communes 
and AHV-HE between the estimation year of 2002 and the base year of 2009. For the years 
2009 and 2010, the healthcare statistics of the SFSO and an estimate of the breakdown of care 
financing from 2002 have been used (FC, 2005). Based on the “no policy change” assumption, 
it is assumed that the proportions of long-term care financing accounted for by private 
households, the state and health insurers will remain constant from 2011 onwards. For the sake 
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of simplicity, the low financing proportion accounted for by social welfare is counted as part of 
the EL AHV.  
 
According to our projections, around 30% of subsidies to care homes will be provided by 
the communes from 2011 onwards, with the remaining 70% provided by the cantons. Where 
outpatient care is concerned, the subsidy costs will be borne more or less equally by the cantons 
and communes. According to the estimates underlying this study, the new arrangement of care 
financing will lead to the proportion of costs in the LTC area borne by the public sector rising 
by five percentage points to 43% between 2009 and 2011. This financing proportion of the 
public sector equates to 0.6% of GDP in the base year of 2009, and rises to 0.7% of GDP in 
2011.  
*** Table 13 *** 
The projections reveal that the cost pressures for the public finances in the LTC area are just 
as high as they are in the LTC area overall. As in the HeL area, the greatest proportion of the 
financing burden is borne by the cantons. According to the “Reference scenario”, the public 
sector financing requirement in the LTC area rises from 1.3% of GDP in 2009 to 1.9% of GDP 
in 2060 (see Table 13). Just as for the overall LTC area, the expenditure of the public sector 
reacts particularly sensitively to change the requirement of care on the part of the population 
(morbidity rate). The expenditure increase by 2060 is felt most keenly in the “Pure ageing” 
scenario (a good 1.5% of GDP), whereas the increase is at its lowest in the “Compression of 
morbidity” scenario (+0.8% of GDP). Public expenditure on long-term care is also exposed to 
significant pressure as a result of wage cost developments (“Wage pressure” scenario). By 
contrast, a higher net rate of immigration has virtually no impact on the change in public 
expenditure (“Migration” scenario). 
*** Table 14 *** 
The cantons bear the principal burden where public expenditure on LTC is concerned, 
accounting for more than two thirds. Between 2009 and 2060, the cantonal financing burden 
rises threefold from 0.4% of GDP to 1.2% of GDP (see Table 14). Even greater cost pressure 
is put on the finances of the communes and the AHV helplessness allowance (AHV-HE. As a 
result, the relative significance of the LTC financing burden for the cantons declines slightly, 
from 70% in 2009 to 67% in 2060. The breakdown of the financing burdens between the 
different levels of government develops independently of the hypothesised scenario (see Figure 
17).  
*** Figure 17 *** 
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Moreover, it is striking that the contributions of the cantons and communes for care homes, 
expressed as a proportion of GDP, rise significantly more strongly (400%) than the 
contributions of these levels of government for Spitex (see Table 14). In addition to the new 
arrangement for the financing of care, this is attributable to the greater increase in spending on 
services for care homes. For example, nominal average expenditure on care homes rises by 
4.6% annually, thereby growing 0.3 percentage points more strongly than expenditure on Spitex 
services.  
7 Mandatory basic healthcare insurance (OKP) 
The expenditure of the OKP in the HeL and LTC area is broken down into outpatient and 
inpatient services for the projections. The breakdown of expenditure for the base year is taken 
from the OKP statistics. In order to avoid double counting with government expenditure, the 
expenditure of the OKP is presented excluding IPR expenditure. In this sense, the net OKP 
expenditure is taken into account for the extrapolation.  
 
The OKP expenditure is extrapolated with the projected expenditure developments for HeL 
and LTC. Accordingly, the different expenditure developments in the HeL and LTC areas feed 
through into the OKP projections. Here it should be noted that the OKP proportion of 
expenditure spent on LTC is projected with the same dynamism as for public expenditure on 
LTC.  
*** Table 15 *** 
As a result, the proportion of financing of LTC accounted for by the OKP remains constant. 
As with the overall expenditure, the expenditure for the OKP comprises the scenarios for both 
HeL and LTC. The composition of scenarios for the OKP is provided in Table 15.  
*** Figure 18 *** 
The change in expenditure for the OKP is similar to that for overall expenditure, which 
means the OKP share of healthcare expenditure in the “Reference scenario” remains at around 
29% between 2009 and 2060 (see Figure 18). Two countervailing effects are responsible for 
this development. On the one hand, the proportion of expenditure on care accounted for by the 
OKP, namely just under 10%, is slightly lower than in overall healthcare, at just under 14%. 
On the other hand, the OKP expenditure rises by just under 0.1% of GDP on a one-off basis as 
a result of the new hospital financing regime introduced at the beginning of 2012 (see Figure 
18).  
*** Table 16 *** 
In the “Reference scenario”, the OKP expenditure rises from 3.3% of GDP in the base year 
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to 4.6% in 2060 (see Table 16). The gross OKP expenditure (including IPR expenditure) 
increases from 3.9% of GDP to 5.0% of GDP. As the OKP currently spends more than 90% on 
the HeL area, the same cost drivers of income and ageing predominate (see Figure 11). In this 
respect, ageing is rather more important as a driver of OKP than for the HeL, as a small 
proportion of OKP expenditure is channelled into LTC. Just like HeL expenditure, the OKP 
expenditure reacts with similar sensitivity to any change in morbidity and wage costs. In the 
“Compression of morbidity” scenario, the rise in expenditure is reduced by 0.5% of GDP or 
38% compared to the “Reference scenario” (see Table 16). If productivity were to rise by 25% 
less than in the overall economy (“Baumol” scenario), expenditure would rise by the same 
amount compared to the “Reference scenario”. There is therefore a difference in expenditure of 
1% of GDP between the best-case scenario (“Compression of morbidity”) and the worst-case 
scenario (“Baumol”), which is equivalent to 30% of expenditure in the base year (3.3% of 
GDP).  
8 Repercussions of reform measures 
8.1 Efficiency scenarios 
The status quo scenarios presented so far are based on a “no policy change” assumption.  By 
contrast, the efficiency scenarios presented in this section take into account the potentially cost-
containing effects of healthcare policy measures. However, the results of the efficiency 
scenarios are subject to the following reservations. As already discussed in Section 2.2.1, the 
projection methodology applied here has the drawback that any behavioural responses on the 
part of patients, doctors, etc. cannot be replicated in the model. In other words, the impact of 
reform measures on expenditure development in healthcare cannot be ascertained within the 
model itself. For that reason, assumptions as regards the extent of the impact of these measures 
need to be fed into the model. As the following explanations will make clear, however, these 
repercussions are difficult to quantify.  
 
In the efficiency scenarios for the HeL area, it is assumed that the following healthcare policy 
measures have a cost-containing effect.  
 The flat-rate payments per case in Swiss hospitals that have applied as part of the new 
hospital financing regime since the beginning of 2012 (diagnosis-related groups, Swiss 
DRG):39 In addition to the flat-rate payments per case, the distinction between listed 
                                                 
39 For a comprehensive review of the reform of hospital financing see the following website of the FOPH: 
http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/krankenversicherung/00305/04104/06668/index.html?lang=de (German, 
French and Italian only, version as of June 2012). 
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hospitals and contractual hospitals (another newly-introduced phenomenon) is also 
likely to have a cost-containing effect. The magnitude of these effects is very difficult 
to evaluate, however. Only the cost of listed hospitals is financed by the dual financing 
system of cantons (a share of at least 55%) and the OKP. In order to make it onto a 
cantonal list, hospitals have to fulfil various economic efficiency and quality criteria. 
Other key elements of the new hospital financing regime such as the introduction of free 
choice between hospitals on the cantonal list throughout Switzerland for OKP insured 
persons and a refined risk-sharing mechanism between the health insurers also have an 
impact on costs, but above all lead to a shift in the burden borne by the various sources 
of financing healthcare (see Section 6).40  
 The “eHealth” Switzerland strategy approved by the Federal Council on 27 June 2007: 
This is designed to improve the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) in the healthcare industry (“eHealth”).41 Key elements include the establishment 
of electronic patient files, online services to promote personal healthcare competencies, 
as well as telemedicine and telemonitoring. The Swiss Conference of Cantonal 
Healthcare Directors has also signed up to the objectives of this strategy. 
 The intended partial revision of the Federal Health Insurance Act (HIA), which was the 
object of the 2B bill passed by the Federal Council to promote managed-care models 
(MC models): However, following the conclusion of the calculations put forward in this 
study, the partial revision of the HIA on MC was rejected in a public referendum of 17 
June 2012. As a consequence, the savings potentially achievable as a result of MC 
models are overestimated in the efficiency scenarios assumed here. MC models also 
apply if insured persons restrict their freedom of choice to select a doctor and accept a 
specified doctor, typically their local GP or a group of doctors as a door opener for 
admission to outpatient healthcare provision. Within the OKP, the most common 
variants are the group practice (Health Maintenance Organisation or “HMO”) and the 
family doctor/GP model (“HAM”).  
 
As a general rule, the introduction of DRG in Switzerland should provide hospitals with 
incentives to cut costs. Put simply, DRG is a classification of illness types into so-called case 
                                                 
40 In the risk-sharing mechanism, it is now not only the age and gender of a group of insured that are taken into 
account, but also any inpatient stays in hospitals and care homes exceeding three days.  
41 For detailed information on the “eHealth” strategy see the following website of financthe FOPH: 
http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/gesundheitspolitik/10357/index.html?lang=de (German, French and Italian 
only, version as of June 2012). 
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groups. These case groups are then subject to further specifications as to what treatment is 
appropriate for a patient in view of their specific condition, e.g. an operation or a more 
conservative type of therapy. The case groups are designed in such a way that they are as 
homogeneous as possible according to medical and economic criteria. For each of the cost 
groups, a flat rate payment (service-related flat-rate sum) is stipulated. This is the sum 
reimbursed to a hospital for the treatment of a patient who is assigned to the case group in 
question. The assignment to a case group is undertaken following treatment at a hospital. The 
DRG system should give hospitals the incentive to treat a patient as cost-effectively as possible. 
In contrast to flat-rate day payments or individual invoices, which provide an incentive to retain 
patients at a hospital for an unnecessary length of time or to carry out unnecessary medical 
procedures, the DRG system offers an incentive to release patients from hospital as early as 
possible. In this way, the DRG is expected to have a cost-containing impact. However, a number 
of critics have objected that the DRG system will give rise to “revolving door effects” (see 
Kirchgässner and Gerritzen, 2011, 28 [52]). The revolving door effect is where patients are 
released from hospital before they are fully well, and then need to be readmitted to hospital 
within a short period of time. Furthermore, releasing patients prematurely from hospital leads 
to a transfer of costs to other areas of the healthcare system.42 Furthermore, the DRG system 
can provide hospitals with an incentive to assign patients to the most treatment-intensive (and 
therefore most expensive) case groups. This would mean that the case group assignment process 
is no longer governed by strictly medical criteria. Moreover, the experience of other countries 
such as the USA suggests that the flat-rate payment invoicing system provides an incentive to 
maximise revenues (see Brügger, 2010, 20 et seq.). Hospitals can pursue this objective by 
treating as many high-risk or highly profitable cases as possible (risk selection and “cream 
skimming”). This then gives rise to costs that would otherwise be avoidable, for example if a 
greater number of operations are undertaken than is medically appropriate due to information 
asymmetry is between patient and doctor. As a result, the introduction of DRG could also give 
rise to an increase in costs.  
 
Accordingly, a very mixed picture emerges when one analyses previous experiences of DRG 
in other countries such as the USA and Germany (see Kirchgässner and Gerritzen (2011, 28 
[52]). For example, when comparing figures for inpatient treatment such as the development of 
the average patient stay in hospitals between Germany (which introduced DRG in 2004) and 
                                                 
42 For a more detailed overview of the possible impact of DRG on hospital behaviour see Brügger (2010, 19 et 
seq., Table 1). 
53 
 
 
Switzerland, Kirchgässner and Gerritzen (2011, 30 et seq.) identified no clear differences. 
However, a number of public hospitals were invoicing on a flat-rate per cost basis even in the 
past. Yet a comparison between these hospitals and hospitals applying other invoicing systems 
for the period 2001 to 2008 likewise reveals that the invoicing system has virtually no impact 
on the duration of a patient’s stay in hospital or the number of rehospitalisations (revolving door 
effect) (see Widmer and Weaver, 2011, 29 et seq.). On the other hand, Widmer and Weaver 
(2011, 29) emphasise that the Swiss DRG system introduced across the country at the start of 
2012 differs substantially from the DRG system applied by a number of Swiss hospitals in the 
past, which therefore makes it impossible to draw any empirical conclusions as to the effects of 
the Swiss DRG. In a comprehensive evaluation of empirical studies on the cost, quality and 
distribution repercussions of DRG, Brügger (2010, 73) arrives at the conclusion that it is 
possible to identify saving effects as a result of DRG, even though the expectations of the cost-
containing repercussions of DRG have not been fully met. This does therefore put forward a 
degree of evidence for saving effects. 
 
The aim of the implementation of the “eHealth” strategy is designed to achieve greater 
efficiency, better quality, and greater security in the healthcare industry. An assessment of 
regulatory consequences conducted by Dobrev et al. (2010) on behalf of the FOPH and Seco 
investigates the costs and benefits of the introduction of electronic patient files. According to 
Dobrev et al. (2010, 35 et seq.), the costs of an electronic patient filing system include in 
particular the procurement, operating and maintenance costs for the hardware and software in 
question. On the benefits side, the introduction of electronic patient files is expected to simplify 
and accelerate processes in medical practices and hospitals alike. Such a system is also expected 
to reduce the number of laboratory and radiology investigations. Alongside these tangible 
benefits, which clearly make themselves felt in the form of cost savings, there are also a number 
of intangible benefits and drawbacks to be considered. These include the well-being of patients, 
for example reassuring their fears thanks to the opportunity to access their own patient file 
directly, and the working satisfaction of staff, for example a feeling of greater professionalism. 
Immaterial benefits can feed through into cost savings indirectly, if for example a sense of 
greater well-being on the part of the patient leads to an improved state of health. However, these 
potentially real cost savings are not taken into account by Dobrev et al. (2010), who limit 
themselves to a monetisation of immaterial benefits and losses. According to Dobrev et al. 
(2010, 40) a good CHF 250 million (or around 0.4% of all healthcare expenditure) can be saved 
over the next 20 years with even low cost savings. The greatest benefit of introducing electronic 
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patient files lies in the growth in the immaterial net benefits, the value of which is quantified 
by Dobrev (2010, 40) at CHF 1.4 billion. If these immaterial net benefits were to feed through 
into an improvement in the population’s state of health, for example, the cost-saving potential 
would be considerable, as the projections of the status quo scenarios illustrate (see Section 5). 
Further cost savings as part of the “eHealth” strategy could result from the development of an 
online information portal on health and from telemedicine and telemonitoring. Where the 
former is concerned, an improvement of the population’s level of understanding could promote 
health-oriented behaviour. Where the latter is concerned, the number of home visits by doctors 
could be reduced, for example.   
 
Concrete findings for Switzerland have only been produced so far for the MC models. 
According to the estimates of Beck et al. (2009), in the case of a CSS group of around 55,000 
insured persons under the MC model system, the gross costs in 2007 were on average some 
8.7% below the costs of a comparable group of insured persons whose members were insured 
under the standard model involving free choice of doctor. In a more recent study, Beck et al. 
(2011) use an expanded set of data and apply three different methods to calculate the average 
saving of MC models – compared to the standard model involving a free choice of doctor – in 
the OKP for the years 2006-2009. Depending on the calculation method in question, the annual 
savings for a group of insured persons in a doctor’s network (compared to a comparable group 
with a free choice of doctor) work out at between just under 12% and just under 21% (see Beck 
et al. 2011, 22, Table 8). It should be borne in mind, however, that these estimates are subject 
to certain uncertainties. Depending on the method employed, for example, different estimates 
are used as to how greatly the (health) risk profile of insured persons in a doctor’s network 
differs from that of persons with a free choice of doctor, the so-called risk selection through 
MC models (see Beck et. Al, 2011, Table 9). Moreover, the repercussions of MC for treatment 
quality are not taken into account in this comparison. Finally, major differences have been 
identified in the level of cost savings generated between the doctors’ networks themselves (see 
Trottmann et al., 2012, 3). This suggests that MC in itself is no guarantor of cost savings 
compared to a system involving the free choice of doctor. Instead, cost-efficient networks of 
doctors are distinguished by other features.  
 
On the basis of empirical analyses of MC models and an evaluation of potential saving 
effects of the three above-mentioned reforms carried out by the FOPH, efficiency scenarios 
have been drawn up for the HeL area. As already mentioned earlier, when constructing the 
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efficiency scenarios it was assumed that the partial HIA revision to include MC would be 
accepted in the referendum on 17 June 2012. As the Swiss electorate rejected the bill, however, 
the previous estimate of the FOPH – that the proportion of the OKP insured in the MC models 
would rise from an estimated current 10% to around 60% in 2020 – now looks rather unrealistic. 
Accordingly, the contribution of MC to cost savings reflected in the efficiency scenarios is 
likely to be exaggerated. Nonetheless, the efficiency scenarios provide a number of indications 
of how great the cost savings could be if MC were to be significantly expanded. If the current 
estimate of the FOPH on the development of MC is taken as a basis, and if it is further 
hypothesised that around 10% of costs could be saved through this model compared to the free 
choice of doctor model, a cost saving of around 5% would result by 2020. A further 5% saving 
is assumed to be achievable through efficiency increases as part of the new hospital financing 
regime and the “eHealth” strategy. Additional savings could be achieved if, as part of the 
“eHealth” strategy, more health-conscious behaviour on the part of citizens were encouraged 
and the number of visits to doctors were reduced. These assumptions form the basis for the so-
called “Moderate efficiency scenario”. As great uncertainties exist with respect to the cost-
saving effects of reforms, an alternative efficiency scenario is taken into account alongside the 
“Moderate efficiency scenario”. This so-called “High-efficiency scenario” is more optimistic, 
and follows Beck et al. (2011), whereby the cost-saving potential of MC compared to the free 
choice of doctor model works out significantly higher than it does in the earlier study by Beck 
et al. (2009) (see above).  
 
Irrespective of the hypothesised savings, these efficiency scenarios are based on the 
“Reference scenario” for HeL. In addition, it is assumed that the above-mentioned reform 
measures will influence expenditure development in healthcare only temporarily up to 2020. 
The assumptions of the described efficiency scenarios are as follows:  
 Moderate: steady rise in cost savings by 2020 thanks to reforms; 2020 saving 10%; 
assumption after 2020: amount saved remains fixed, i.e. the relative saving declines. 
 High: steady rise in cost savings by 2020 thanks to reforms; 2020 saving 20%; 
assumption after 2020: amount saved remains fixed, i.e. the relative saving declines. 
 
According to a study carried out by Obsan, productivity gains can also be achieved in the 
care area through measures which promote innovation, technological advances, and the 
reorganisation of care processes (change in the capability profile of staff and telemedicine), (see 
Jaccard Ruedin and Weaver, 2009, 12). This potential is illustrated in an efficiency scenario for 
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long-term care, namely the Productivity advances scenario. This assumes – in contrast to the 
“Reference scenario” – that the Baumol effect in LTC can be reduced by a half through 
productivity-enhancing measures. It should be borne in mind that this scenario is only aimed at 
illustrating how significant the leverage of productivity-enhancing measures in long-term care 
could be. The notion that the Baumol Effect can be halved is likely to be a thoroughly optimistic 
assumption. In view of the high labour intensity that characterises the care sector, implementing 
measures to encourage productivity is likely to prove difficult. 
8.2 Results 
On the basis of the underlying assumptions, the results of the efficiency scenarios show that 
measures to encourage productivity in LTC (reduction of the Baumol Effect) in particular can 
have the effect of containing the rise in healthcare expenditure. Compared to the impact of an 
improvement in the population’s state of health, as is hypothesised in the “Healthy ageing” 
scenario, the cost-containing effects of reforms in HeL turn out to be moderate. Greater savings 
can be achieved with the OKP. 
 
The rather moderate overall effect of reform measures in HeL is attributable to two factors. 
First, it is assumed a priori that while reforms do lead to a reduction of healthcare expenditure 
by 2020, they are unable to contain the dynamics of expenditure over the long term.  
***Figure 19 *** 
As a consequence, expenditure in the “Moderate efficiency scenario” and “High efficiency 
scenario” converges towards the projected expenditure development of the “Reference 
scenario” over the long term (Figure 19). In addition, the reforms are concentrated in the HeL 
area, which according to our projections is exposed to significantly lower cost pressures than 
the LTC area (see Section 5). Accordingly, expenditure on LTC develops similarly in the 
“Moderate efficiency scenario” and “High efficiency scenario” as it does in the “Reference 
scenario”. As a result of the two factors referred to above, the development of expenditure in 
both these efficiency scenarios approximates to that of the “Reference scenario” after 2020 (see 
Figure 19). In a comparison of the saving effects of reforms in the health industry as a whole, 
in the state sector, and in the OKP, it emerges that the alleviation of the burden (compared to 
the “Reference scenario”) is most pronounced for the OKP and least pronounced for the state 
(see Table 17). This is primarily attributable to the fact that the proportion of OKP expenditure 
accounted for by LTC (just over 10%, base year 2009), is significantly lower than in the 
healthcare industry as a whole (14%) and for the public sector (just under 20%, including IPR 
proportion for LTC). Moreover, according to our projections the rise in expenditure on inpatient 
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services in HeL is higher than on outpatient services, and the public sector bears a 
disproportionately large share of these services at 42% (base year 2009). By contrast, 
expenditure on hospitals accounts for 28% of overall health care expenditure. Only 19% of 
expenditure is currently spent by the OKP on inpatient services in HeL.  
*** Table 17 *** 
For the healthcare system as a whole, the rise in expenditure by 2060 in the “High efficiency 
scenario” and “Moderate efficiency scenario” is lower than that of reference scenario by 0.6% 
of GDP and 0.3% of GDP respectively (see Table 17). By contrast, the “Healthy ageing” 
scenario alone is capable of reducing the rise in expenditure by 1% of GDP compared to the 
“Reference scenario”. Nevertheless, roughly the same effect as the “Healthy ageing” scenario 
is produced by ongoing advances in productivity in the LTC area (“Productivity advances” 
scenario).  
 
Where public expenditure is concerned, the reform measures deliver savings of just 0.1% of 
GDP by 2060 compared to the “Reference scenario”, even in the most optimistic efficiency 
scenario (“High efficiency scenario”) (see Table 17). With the “Moderate efficiency scenario”, 
the saving is as little as 0.05% of GDP. This also feeds through into the growth rates of nominal 
expenditure, which in the “High efficiency scenario” amount to an average of around 3.4% a 
year, barely below those of the “Reference scenario” (just under 3.5%). By way of comparison, 
the improved state of the population’s health hypothesised in the “Healthy ageing scenario” 
would on its own result in a cost reduction of 0.4% of GDP compared to the “Reference 
scenario”, limiting growth in nominal expenditure to an average of 3.3% a year. Similar cost 
savings to the improvement in the population’s state of health in the “Healthy ageing” scenario 
could also be produced by ongoing productivity gains in long-term care (“Productivity 
advances” scenario).  
 
Given the relatively small share spent by the OKP on the financing of LTC, the savings 
effect of the reform measures in the “High efficiency scenario” – which results in a reduction 
in expenditure of 0.2% of GDP by 2060 compared to the Reference scenario – is greater here 
than in the public sector (see Table 17). The cost saving under the “High efficiency scenario” 
is just as high as with the assumption of ongoing productivity advances in LTC, and amounts 
to as much as two thirds of the cost saving achieved with the "Healthy ageing” scenario. In the 
“Moderate efficiency scenario”, the cost saving amounts to just 0.1% of GDP compared to the 
“Reference scenario”.  
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9 Comparisons with other studies 
This section undertakes comparisons between healthcare development scenarios produced 
to date (Section 9.1) with other recent studies for Switzerland (Section 9.2) and with EU 
projections (Section 9.3). When undertaking a direct comparison between studies, it should be 
borne in mind that conclusions cannot easily be drawn as to which expenditure projections are 
more pessimistic or optimistic with respect to the cost effects of certain factors such as the 
ageing of the population. It is more the case that there are a number of reasons for the different 
results arrived at, such as the choice of database in question, the time horizon or base year 
selected, and the projection methodology. 
9.1 2008 development scenarios 
A comparison with the results of the first expenditure projections as part of the 2008 
development scenarios reveal that the demographic pressures on healthcare expenditure have 
actually increased.43 When comparing the results of this study with those of the first expenditure 
projections back in 2008, however, it should be recalled that the selected timeframe for this 
study (2009-2060) is not the same as that for the study of 2008 (2005-2050). Moreover, a base 
year effect can be observed which is attributable to forecast errors regarding economic 
development and healthcare expenditure between 2006 and 2009. As a result, directly 
comparing the Reference scenario from 2008 (“2008 reference scenario”) with the current 
“Reference scenario” is an inappropriate way of extracting information on the different impacts 
of cost drivers in both scenarios. To enable meaningful information to be extracted, the “2008 
reference scenario” has been updated to take account of the actual development of the Swiss 
population between 2005 in 2009 and the new demographic scenario drawn up by the SFSO 
(A-00-2010). On this basis, the expenditure for this so-called “Adjusted scenario” can be 
projected for the period 2009 to 2050. At the same time, a structural break in the data due to a 
revision of the government finance statistics in 2008 and various assumptions on income 
elasticity have been taken into account in this “Adjusted scenario”. For example, in the “2008 
reference scenario” it is hypothesised that income elasticity will converge from 1.1 towards 1.0 
between 2005 and 2050 (see Colombier and Weber, 2008, 15). In the “Reference scenario” of 
this study, a constant income elasticity of 1.1 is assumed (see Section 4.1).  
*** Table 18 *** 
The “Adjusted scenario” results in an additional expenditure burden of more than 0.5% of 
                                                 
43 The 2008 development scenarios were drawn up as part of the Legislature Financial Plan 2009-2011 (FC, 2008). For a more detailed 
illustration of the results, see Colombier snd Weber (2008). 
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GDP higher than the “2008 Reference scenario” between 2009 in 2050 (+4.5% of GDP compared 
to +3.9% of GDP) (see Table 18). This greater growth dynamism is first and foremost attributable 
to the new demographic scenario (A-00-2010), which envisages a higher number of older persons 
as a proportion of the overall population than the scenario of four years earlier (A-00-2005). Less 
than 0.1% of GDP, or 15% of the additional burden, can be explained by the adjusted assumption 
for income elasticity. 
 
Nonetheless, overall expenditure in the current “Reference scenario” is projected to rise to a 
lesser extent by 2050 than in the 2008 reference scenario (15.3% of GDP versus 15.5% of GDP) 
(see Table 18). This is explained by the fact that economic growth in the years prior to 2009 
turned out to be higher than expected, while the rise in healthcare expenditure was assumed to 
be lower than in the “2008 reference scenario”. As a result of this base year effect, short-term 
expenditure development in the “2008 reference scenario” was slightly overestimated (+0.3% of 
GDP).  
 
Where public healthcare expenditure is concerned too, a comparison between the “2008 
reference scenario” and the “Adjusted scenario” reveals a higher growth dynamism in the latter 
(+0.3 GDP percent), which is attributable to new data on demographic development and 
methodological adjustments. However, the level of public expenditure on healthcare in 2050 is 
projected to be lower in the current “Reference scenario” than in the “2008 reference scenario” 
(5.4% of GDP versus 7.0% of GDP). This downward correction is attributable to the base year 
effect (forecasting errors on expenditure and GDP development) and the above-mentioned 
revision of the government finance statistics in 2008. 
9.2 Swiss healthcare expenditure projections 
Alongside this study, a number of other analyses have grappled with the question of how 
Swiss healthcare development will develop in the future, particularly against the background 
of an ageing population. The key difference between other studies in this area on the one hand, 
and this study and its predecessor study from 2008 (Colombier and Weber, 2008) on the other, 
is that the former focus less comprehensively on Swiss healthcare as a whole, and for the most 
part focus on projections in certain areas on healthcare, e.g. LTC (Weaver et al., 2008). The 
OECD study aside (Oliveira Martins et al., 2006), the time horizon of these studies only extends 
to 2030, which means that the cost effect resulting from the ageing of the “baby boomer” 
generation cannot be fully captured. Furthermore, there are a number of methodological 
differences in the way non-demographic cost drivers are captured (see Section 2.2.2, Table 3). 
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As already mentioned at the beginning of Section 9, a direct comparison of the results of the 
different studies is also complicated if the time horizon and the databases used do not concur. 
As a consequence, it cannot be established to what extent the differences in the results are 
attributable to a base year effect, for example, and to intriguing cost drivers. As the other studies 
rely on the older demographic scenario of the SFSO (A-00-2005) and predominantly take 2005 
or 2004 as the base year, only the results of the predecessor study to this study (Colombier and 
Weber, 2008) are drawn on to ensure better compatibility. In addition, the way the results of 
this predecessor study compare to the current study, and therefore how the new demographic 
scenario of the SFSO (A-00-2010) influence healthcare expenditure projections, can be seen in 
Section 9.1.   
*** Table 19 *** 
When comparing the results of the 2008 development scenarios with other studies, the 
scenarios used are those which provide the greatest degree of overlap in the assumptions made 
(see Table 19).44 Furthermore, the same time horizon is selected for the comparison. To 
illustrate why the comparability of the results may be limited, potential explanations of any 
differences in the results are provided in the final column of Table 19 in the form of a few key 
words. Overall, it emerges that differences in the results are frequently attributable to the choice 
of database and the projection methodology used for the non-demographic cost drivers.  
 
Oliviera Martins et al. (2006) present healthcare expenditure projections for 30 OECD 
countries, including Switzerland. This study also uses the same timeframe as the 2008 
development scenarios (Colombier and Weber, 2008). A comparison reveals that a higher 
expenditure increase of around 0.4-0.5% of GDP is expected by the OECD study in both the 
areas of HeL and LTC. The reasons for these sharp deviations may be the database used and 
the application of different methods to capture advances in medical technology (see also Section 
2.2.2). For example, there are differences in the demarcation of public healthcare expenditure, 
which results in the OECD study (Oliviera Martins, 2006, 56 and 65, Tables A2.3-A2.4) giving 
a public sector expenditure proportion for GoL and LTC in the base year of 6.2% and 1.2% of 
GDP respectively, which is significantly higher than Colombier and Weber (2008, 54, Table 
A6), who arrive at 4.4% and 0.5% of GDP respectively. As a proportion of GDP, however, the 
expenditure under the 2008 development scenarios develops more dynamically than that in the 
OECD study. For example, the percentage rise in expenditure as a proportion of GDP according 
to the 2008 development scenarios is a good 40% in the HeL area and 180% in LTC, whereas 
                                                 
44 For methodological comparisons see Section 2.2.2, Table 3. 
61 
 
 
the equivalent rises in the OECD study are 35% and 120% respectively. Furthermore, the 
differing results may also be explained by the fact that the OECD study relies on an estimate 
for expenditure profiles by age, gender and services, whereas the projections of the 2008 
development scenarios are based on data from the SFSO statistics.  
 
A study conducted by Obsan focuses on the projection of expenditure in the area of long-
term care from the age of 65 and upwards over the period 2005-2030 (Weaver et al., 2008). In 
a scenario comparable to the “Healthy ageing” scenario in this study, Weaver et al. (2008, 66, 
Tableau 7) arrive at the same figure for expenditure growth as the 2008 development scenarios, 
namely 0.7% of GDP. At the same time, the projections differ in two key respects. On the one 
hand, the data is available in the LTC area for the care requirements (morbidity) of persons who 
use the services of care homes and Spitex. This data is incorporated into the projections of 
Weaver et al. (2008, et seq.). Instead of the expenditure per capita of population used here, 
therefore, this study can rely on expenditure per individual care case. On the other hand, the 
Baumol Effect is determined in a wholly exogenous way using past data for the EU and 
Switzerland (see Weaver et al. 2008, 55 et seq.).45 By contrast, in the projection model of the 
FFA, the Baumol Effect is influenced by the assumption regarding overall economic advances 
in productivity (see Appendix A1). Despite these differing approaches, the extent of the Baumol 
Effect in both studies is comparable, which may be one reason why the results tally.  
 
The greatest difference to the 2008 development scenarios can be found in the results of the 
study by Vuilleumier et al. (2007). According to their “Référence morbidité retardée” scenario, 
overall healthcare expenditure increases by 3.9% of GDP over the period 2004-2030 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2007). In the comparable scenario of Colombier and Weber (2008, 51, Table 
A1), namely “Healthy Ageing”, the projected rise in expenditure is significantly lower at 1.7% 
of GDP. The difference is attributable to the fact that, unlike Colombier and Weber (2008), 
Vuilleumier et al. (2007) extrapolate the cost trend for the non-demographic drivers from the 
past (see Section , Table 3). On the one hand, this major difference is reflected in great 
uncertainty regarding the cost impact of non-demographic drivers. On the other, a naive 
extrapolation of a cost trend presents serious drawbacks, as has already been explained in 
section 2.2.2. In particular, such an approach neglects the correlation between demographic 
development, economic development and the development of expenditure in healthcare. 
                                                 
45 This approach can lead to a contradiction within the projection model, if the assumption on productivity 
advances in the overall economy is not aligned with the assumption regarding the Baumol Effect.  
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Finally, the studies of Steinmann et al. (2007) and Steinman and Telser (2005) focus on the 
cost effects of an ageing population in the area of Gol and for the OKP with a time horizon of 
2030. Both these studies focus on proximity to death as a cost driver. In addition, the second 
study considers age-specific cost effects in the “Dynamised ageing” scenario (see Steinmann 
and Telser, 2005, Section 5). This scenario involves extrapolating the trend for the period 1996-
2003, whereby in the OKP the per capita expenditure for the older population rises more 
strongly than for the younger population.46 The “Death-related costs” scenario in the 2008 
development scenarios, which likewise considers proximity to death, arrives at roughly the 
same expenditure growth (0.4% of GDP) as Steinmann et al. (2007, 17). An explanation of the 
age-specific cost effect could be that the state of health of the older population in particular has 
deteriorated. In this sense the most comparable scenario to that of Steinmann and Telser (2005) 
is the “Pure ageing” scenario, which assumes a deterioration in the state of health for the entire 
population. According to the “Pure ageing” scenario, the demographically-driven effect alone 
is significantly greater than in the “Dynamised ageing” scenario, even though the latter 
additionally captures cost-specific ageing effects (see Table 19). This difference is hardly likely 
to be attributable to the fact that the “Pure ageing” scenario neglects the issue of proximity to 
death (see Section 3.6). A more likely explanation is the fact that the base year and the 
expenditure profiles differ considerably. Added to this is the fact that, unlike all other Swiss 
studies, the studies of Steinmann et al. (2007) and Steinmann and Telser (2005) do not rely on 
the medium base scenario of the SFSO (2006, A-00-2005), but on alternative demographic 
scenarios drawn up by Münz and Ulrich (2001).  
9.3 EU healthcare expenditure projections 
The Ageing Working Group of the EU investigates at regular intervals how the ageing of the 
population influences demographic-dependent government expenditure such as expenditure on 
healthcare. For purposes of comparison, we look at the EU study from 2009 (AWG, 2009) and 
the very recently published EU study from 2012 (AWG, 2012). Just like this study, both the 
EU studies have a projection horizon of 2060, although each has a different base year, namely 
2007 (AWG, 2009) and 2010 (AWG, 2012). When undertaking a comparison with the 
expenditure projections of this study for Switzerland, it should be borne in mind that the 
                                                 
46 In a comparison of per capita expenditure between 1997 and 2009, however, it emerges that the cost of the 
very aged segment of the population (around 90 and upwards) has actually declined. This means that the age-
specific cost effect in the “Dynamised ageing” scenario drawn up by Steinmann and Telser (2005) has been 
overestimated from today’s perspective.  
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projections may differ with respect to the assumed demographic and economic development of 
the individual countries in question. Further important differences can be found in the extent of 
healthcare expenditure in the base year, the expenditure profiles applied, and institutional 
regulations for national healthcare systems. 
 
When comparing expenditure projections for any other country with Switzerland, it is 
important to remember that the proportion of expenditure on healthcare in Switzerland 
accounted for by the public sector is low at 31%. In the 17 EU countries in the eurozone, the 
public sector accounts for an average share of around 75% of all healthcare expenditure. Among 
other reasons, this discrepancy is attributable to the fact that in Switzerland – unlike in other 
European countries – the OKP is offered solely by private insurers, and is therefore not assigned 
to the government sector in the national accounts. If the expenditure of the OKP were assigned 
to the government sector, the resulting financing proportion accounted for by the state would 
amount to some 60% of all healthcare expenditure. Furthermore, a constant income elasticity 
of 1.1 is hypothesised in the “Reference scenario for Switzerland”, whereas in the EU 
projections it is assumed that the elasticity hypothesised in the base year will converge from 
1.1 towards 1.0 by 2060. However, this methodological difference has virtually no impact on 
the end results, as the higher projected expenditure increase it implies amounts to just 0.1% of 
GDP (see Table 20a, “Reference scenario” and “EU” scenario). 
*** Tables 20a and 20b *** 
As the assumptions of the Reference scenario are largely based on those of the EU 
projections, the results of the reference scenarios of both projections can be compared with one 
another.47 In order to improve comparability with the EU projections even further, the “EU” 
scenario is additionally taken into account for the HeL. This scenario involves the assumption 
of income elasticity converging toward 1.0 over the projection period. A comparison with the 
EU projections from 2009 reveals that a greater rise in public healthcare expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP is expected for Switzerland (including the OKP) than for the eurozone (see 
Tables 20a and 20b). In a comparison with the latest EU projections, however, the picture 
changes. Here a distinction needs to be made between the HeL and LTC areas. According to 
                                                 
47 It should be emphasised, however, that the probability of requiring care (care requirement ratio) is taken into 
account for the extrapolation of expenditure on long-term care in the EU projections (see Section 2.1). Even so, 
given otherwise similar assumptions the projection results should not differ if the expenditure per person requiring 
care is not influenced over the projection period by a change in care requirement ratios. The concordance of the 
results of Weaver et al. (2008) and Colombier and Weber (2008) for the case of Switzerland indicates that this 
latter prerequisite is met (see Section 9.2, Table 19). 
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the latest EU projections, the public expenditure which the average eurozone country devotes 
to HeL rises much less than in the older projections, so that the additional burden on the public 
finances of the eurozone works out significantly lower (-0.5% of GDP) than is the case for 
Switzerland (state plus OKP) (see Table 28). According to the EU (AWG 2012, 185), the strong 
decline in dynamism compared to the projections of 2009 relates to the assumption of greater 
growth in the younger population and changes in the expenditure profiles. This could also 
explain the difference vis-à-vis the results of Switzerland.  
 
According to the latest EU projections, the additional burden on the public finances of the 
eurozone as a result of LTC rises just as much as it does for the Swiss public finances (incl. 
OKP) (see Table 20b). The anticipated rise in expenditure on LTC for the eurozone states is 
estimated to be sharply higher than in 2009. This is primarily explained by the fact that the new 
calculations are based on a higher rate of expenditure for the older population in the base year 
(see AWG, 2012, 219). Finally, it is striking that the public expenditure of the EU states, 
measured as a proportion of GDP, is in some cases much higher in the new base year of 2010 
than in the old base year of 2007. According to the EU, this is attributable to the financial and 
economic crisis of 2009, which was followed by a sharp decline in value added in the EU.  
10 Conclusions 
The projections show that the ageing of the population has a strong influence on the 
development of healthcare expenditure, as expected. Compared to the development scenarios 
of 2008, the demographic effect is even more pronounced. But the significance of the 
phenomenon of ageing varies according to the area of healthcare being observed. Particularly 
affected by this phenomenon is the area of long-term care for those aged 65 and upwards. 
According to the projections, for example, the proportion of expenditure on long-term care will 
treble as a proportion of GDP between 2009 and 2060. Above all, pressure emerges from cost 
developments in the inpatient area of long-term care, in other words care homes. The 
demographic pressure building up in this area could be reduced by a strengthening of long-term 
care in the home, in other words through Spitex. The ageing of the population is also an 
important cost driver in the area of healthcare excluding long-term care, but the supply-side and 
demand-side cost drivers triggered by the assumed income growth are more significant here.  
 
Compared to other sources of finance for the Swiss healthcare system, namely the OKP and 
private households, it is the healthcare expenditure financing share accounted for by the public 
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sector that rises disproportionately. This is on the one hand attributable to the relatively high 
share that the public sector has to spend on long-term care. On the other hand, the new hospital 
financing regime and the new arrangement for care financing is also leading to a shift in the 
financing burden to the detriment of the cantons in particular. The cantons are the most heavily 
affected of any level of government, as their contributions to healthcare already account for 
some 66% of all public spending in this area. Moreover, the projections reveal that the growth 
surge in long-term care will be heavily felt by the communes and the helplessness allowance of 
the AHV.  
 
Above and beyond these findings, the efficiency scenarios indicate that long-term cost 
savings will be generated by reforms such as the “eHealth” strategy of the Confederation and 
cantons, the new hospital financing regime (Swiss DRG), and the promotion of managed care 
models in the OKP. The strongest cost savings in this respect are expected for the OKP. It 
should be remembered, however, that the cost effects of reforms in the projection approach 
pursued in this study have had to be largely fed in exogenously, which limits the meaningfulness 
of their hypothesized impact. The creation of a microsimulation model for the Swiss healthcare 
system is therefore worth considering. A model of this kind would be superior to the project 
approach used here with respect to the replication of reform measures. 
 
A comparison with other studies on the long-term development of Swiss healthcare 
expenditure makes it clear that diverging results are first and foremost attributable to differences 
in the modelling of non-demographic cost drivers. Where the approach taken is comparable, as 
applies in the case of Weaver et al. (2008), the results are fairly concordant. A further 
comparison with the latest projections of the EU shows that significantly greater cost pressures 
are expected for the Swiss public finances (incl. the OKP) in the area of healthcare excluding 
long-term care than is the case for the eurozone states. Among other reasons, this may be 
attributable to differences in the demographic scenarios and the cost structure in the base year. 
In the area of long-term care from the age of 65 and upwards, the projected expenditure growth 
for the Swiss public finances (incl. the OKP) is of a similar magnitude to that of the eurozone 
states.  
 
As the projections show, healthy ageing on the part of the population would significantly 
reduce cost pressures in healthcare. According to a study by the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), up to 50% of chronic, non-communicable medical conditions could be avoided by 
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people adopting a healthy lifestyle in the middle years of their life. A policy of prevention which 
encourages healthy behaviour on the part of the population in a targeted way, by trying to 
influence key determinants of health such as nutrition, movement, tobacco consumption and 
alcohol consumption, could therefore make a substantial contribution to alleviating the cost 
burden.  
 
Furthermore, the projections indicate that substantial cost increases are looming as a result 
of a shortage of healthcare personnel. In the area of long-term care in particular, a substantial 
need for labour resources is anticipated in the medium to long term. The wage pressure triggered 
by a shortage of personnel would also intensify the price effects anticipated in long-term care 
as a result of Baumol’s cost disease (“Baumol Effect”). Forward-looking personnel planning is 
required if cost pressures as a result of a shortage of personnel are to be avoided. Simple 
measures here include not just further training and development, but also attracting and 
retaining staff in the healthcare industry. Another important aspect of forward-looking 
personnel planning is close cooperation between the Confederation and the cantons. In view of 
the high cost pressure expected on public and private finances as a result of developments in 
long-term care for those aged 65 and upwards, the proposal put forward by Schips and 
Abrahamsen (2002) for covering the collective risk of care requirements is worthy of 
consideration. 
 
The question of immigrant labour is also closely linked to the anticipated scarcity of 
healthcare personnel. However, the projections of this study show that higher net immigration 
would hardly yield any tangible benefits in terms of alleviating cost burdens in healthcare. The 
resulting higher economic growth would be almost wholly offset by the associated income 
effects, such as increased demand for healthcare services. In the rather unlikely case that 
immigration were largely restricted to specialist healthcare workers, the savings would 
probably be greater if this had the effect of reducing wage pressures in the Swiss healthcare 
industry.  
 
Finally, it is the view of several healthcare economists that supply-side cost drivers – such 
as advances in medical technology, supply-induced demand, and risk selection – have a more 
important role to play where expenditure development in healthcare is concerned then the 
growing demands made by an increasingly prosperous society of its healthcare system (e.g. 
Hsiao and Heller, 2007; Vladeck and Rice, 2009). In the projections of this study, this is 
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reflected insofar as supply-side cost drivers such as the Baumol Effect (and the increase in 
productivity in healthcare) have a strong impact on cost development. Accordingly, substantial 
cost savings can be achieved through efficiency increases in the healthcare system. These could 
be achieved in various ways, such as the more efficient use of new technologies, an integrated 
care model for chronically ill patients, or compensation systems which set incentives for cost-
efficient behaviour.  
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Appendix 
A1 Formal representation of projection methodology 
The projections of expenditure per capita for age cohort j for year t can be represented with the 
help of the following equation, the basic formula for the expenditure projections.48 
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whereby: 
 t= 1,....,50 and 0:= base year. 
 E(t,j):= Expenditure (nominal) on healthcare excluding long-term care and on long-term 
care (from the age of 65 and upwards) per capita of age cohort j in year t, divided by 
gender in each case. 
 Pop(t,j):= Number of men or women of age cohort j in the year t according to the SFSO 
demographic scenarios A-00-2010 and A-17-2010 respectively. 
 Morbidity parameter: Additional period of life of age cohort j in a better state of health 
(morbidity) in year t compared to age cohort j in base year.  
o τ(t,j): Number of years spent in better state of health. 
o λ(t,j): Period of life of less than one year spent in better state of health (measured 
in months). 
o For the area of healthcare excluding long-term care an improvement in the state 
of health has been assumed from the age of 41, j>41, and for long-term care 
(over 65) from 66 and upwards, j>65.  
 y(i):= Growth rate of real GDP per capita in year i, i≤t. 
 1+η(i):= “Income elasticity” in year i, η(i)≥0, i≤t. 
                                                 
48 It should be emphasised that the term representing morbidity change in the Equation (1) is only an 
approximation of the correct formula. The actual formula applied for the calculations is relatively complex, 
however, and therefore more difficult to comprehend intuitively. This is why a simple representation has been 
chosen for the explanation of the projection methodology.  
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 π:= Long-term inflation rate. 
 ω:= Long-term growth rate of average real wages. 
 μ:= Baumol or wage pressure parameter; μ=1: fully impacting Baumol Effect, i.e. no 
productivity advances in healthcare; μ=0: No Baumol Effect or wage pressure; μ>0, i.e. 
real wages in healthcare grow more strongly than in the overall economy (wage 
pressure) or a cumulative impact of Baumol Effect and wage pressure.  
 
The right-hand side of the basic formula (A1.1) should be understood as follows: 
 The first coefficient describes the correlation between increasing life expectancy and a 
change in the morbidity of age cohort j in the year t. Here it is assumed that, as life 
expectancy rises, the probability of falling ill or requiring care at a particular age will 
change compared to the base year. For example, let us assume that the life expectancy 
of 50-year-old women in 2040 is 1 year and 8 months more than in the base year of 
2009, and that 50-year-old women will spend this additional period of life in better 
health than 50-year-old women in the base year (“Healthy ageing” scenario). For the 
purposes of simplification, we can then assume that 50-year-old women in 2040 are in 
the same state of health as women in the base year who are 1 year and 8 months younger, 
in other words women aged 48 years and 4 months. Accordingly the morbidity 
parameter is (31,50)=1.49 As only annual data is available for expenditure per capita, 
the annual expenditure for the age cohorts of 48 and 49-year-old women in the base year 
have to be weighted with the corresponding number of months. In this example, 
λ(31,50) is equal to exactly eight. This results de facto in a shift of the expenditure 
profile in year t to the right as compared to the base year (see Figure 3). This approach 
is selected for healthcare excluding long-term care for all age cohorts from the age of 
41 and upwards, and for long-term care for all age cohorts from the age of 66 and 
upwards.  
 The second coefficient describes the demand and supply effects triggered by the rise in 
economic income which are only assumed to have an impact on the area of healthcare 
expenditure excluding long-term care. If η>0, it is assumed that an increase in real GDP 
per capita has a disproportionate impact on the expenditure per capita of an age cohort. 
As the figures for expenditure per capita are nominal, the inflation rate π is also taken 
                                                 
49 As the base year is 2009 (t=0), t=31 is equivalent to the year 2040.  
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into account. In both cases, the expenditure profile in any particular year t shifts upwards 
compared to the expenditure profile of the base year (see Figure 3). 
 The third coefficient can firstly capture the Baumol Effect, a supply-side price effect.50 
For the Baumol Effect, it is assumed that real wage growth in healthcare (or in a sub-
area of healthcare) mirrors that of the wider economy. In addition, average real wage 
growth in the economy reflects productivity advances. If there are no productivity 
advances in healthcare, the Baumol Effect is felt in full, and μ is equal to 1. Wage growth 
then feeds through fully into a price effect, and leads to an above-average rate of 
inflation in healthcare. If 0< μ <1, the Baumol Effect can be said to be manifesting itself 
incompletely, since as there may be productivity gains in healthcare these are lower than 
those in the wider economy. Accordingly, the growth in wages is not fully passed on to 
prices. Secondly, thanks to the parameter μ a price effect can be captured which is 
attributed to above-average wage growth rates in healthcare, such as that triggered by a 
shortage in healthcare personnel. In this case, μ>0 applies. This parameter can even 
assume values of more than 1, because – unlike the Baumol Effect – the magnitude of 
this price effect is not limited to the difference between productivity advances in the 
wider economy and those in healthcare. If the parameter μ assumes the value of 1, this 
means that wage growth in healthcare is twice that of the wider economy. In this case, 
the resulting price effect is just as great as with the full Baumol Effect. If the two 
described effects are cumulated, μ must likewise assume a value greater than 0. In both 
cases, namely with the Baumol Effect and “Wage pressure” in healthcare, the 
expenditure profile of a particular year t shifts upwards compared to the profile of the 
base year (see Figure 3).  
 
After ascertaining the expenditure per capita of an age cohort j for each year t, the overall 
expenditure is then calculated for the year t. In order to ascertain overall expenditure, the 
expenditure per capita of an age cohort is first multiplied by the number of population in each 
age cohort and then totalled up across all age cohorts (see Equation (A1.2). This is done 
separately by gender before subsequently illustrating total healthcare expenditure. 
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j
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50 For a more detailed description of the Baumol Effect, see Section 3.4. 
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A2 Estimating income elasticity 
Expenditure projections for healthcare involve considerable uncertainty regarding the impact 
of non-demographic cost drivers. In order to reduce this uncertainty, an empirical estimation 
has been carried out for Switzerland involving the most significant potential cost drivers in 
healthcare. Here the focus is on the analysis of the correlation between overall economic income 
development and healthcare expenditure. This correlation is described in this study – and 
theoretically not entirely correctly – as income elasticity (see Section 3.2). The empirical 
analysis reveals that both demand-side and supply-side cost drivers, particularly advances in 
medical technology, can be captured with the help of income elasticity. Moreover, as the cost 
effect of advances in medical technology can hardly be quantified, the approach selected for 
the projections, namely capturing such advances through income elasticity, appears to be a 
feasible route to take. Above and beyond this, the estimates indicate that Swiss healthcare 
expenditure cannot be characterised by a deterministic trend. This argues against hypothesising 
such a trend for non-demographic cost drivers in the expenditure projections (e.g. Vuilleumier 
et al., 2007).   
 
Method and database 
The estimations of income elasticity for healthcare expenditure have been run with a random 
sample of Swiss data for the years 1960 to 2009. This therefore makes it a time series analysis 
in which various supply-side and demand-side cost drivers are taken into account. The 
estimation equation is as follows: 
ht = α + Trend + β1*yt + ∑ βi*xi,t + ut (A2.1) 
whereby: h:= Real healthcare expenditure per capita, 
y:= Real GDP per capita, 
xi:= Further cost driver i, i = 2,...,n, 
α:= Constant, 
Trend:= Deterministic trend, 
βi: = Elasticity of healthcare expenditure with reference to cost driver i,  
  i = 1,...n, 
u:= Residual, 
t:= Year. 
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As is generally the case in such estimations, the healthcare expenditure is expressed in per capita 
values and deflated with the GDP deflator (e.g. Oliveira-Martins et al., 2006). All stochastic 
variables are estimated in natural logarithms, which among other things permits the 
interpretation of the coefficient βi as elasticity. In addition to real GDP per capita, which is used 
as a proxy for income, the potential cost drivers listed below are also factored into the 
estimations. As a proxy for advances in medical technology, the change in mortality rates for 
men and women are used, along with a deterministic trend and the proportion of GDP accounted 
for by research and development expenditure (R&D) in healthcare in the USA.51'52 The supply-
side cost drivers are represented by the density of doctors (number of doctors per 100,000 
inhabitants). For Baumol’s cost disease, the difference between real wages and productivity is 
taken into account (so-called Baumol variable according to Hartwig (2008)), while for the 
ageing of the population the proportion of the overall population aged 65 and upwards is used.53 
In addition, a number of the regressions involve dummy variables for the introduction of the 
OKP in 1986 and for the structural break in the GDP series in 1980 due to the revision of the 
general government accounts as per the European System of Accounts 1998.  
 
The data for the Swiss healthcare industry is taken from the healthcare statistics of the SFSO.54 
The R&D expenditure for healthcare in the USA is taken from the OECD Health Database. The 
GDP series up to 1979 comes from the SFSO, whereas data after 1979 has been downloaded 
from the Seco website. The Swiss population data is taken from the population statistics of the 
SFSO. 
 
As all variables display a stochastic trend, there is a risk of spurious correlations (see Table 
A2.1). As such, it is unclear whether a correlation exists between healthcare expenditure and a 
cost driver if the coefficient of the cost driver is statistically significant. If both variables reveal 
a stochastic trend, the significance may be coincidental. However, statistical significance is 
more meaningful if the regressors and the target variables are cointegrated. A cointegration 
points to a long-term correlation between the tested variables. For a cointegration, it needs to 
be established whether or not the variables have a unit root. For that purpose, a robust unit root 
                                                 
51 The OECD Health Database does not contain any data for R&D expenditure in Switzerland. The fact that 
spillover effects for R&D expenditure in healthcare are likely to exist is an argument in favour of using US data.  
52 It is essentially difficult to quantify the effect of advances in medical technology (see Dybczak and Przywara, 
2010, 6 et seq.).  
53 Productivity is measured as GDP per gainfully employed person. 
54 For more details on this database see Appendix A3, Table A3. 
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test is used which is less sensitive towards structural breaks than a conventional unit root test, 
e.g. the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (for example, see Franses and Lucas, 1997, 106).  
*** Table A2.1 *** 
As already explained above, the results show that all the considered variables are first-order 
integrated and therefore reveal a stochastic trend (see Table A2.1). This means that a necessary 
condition for cointegration between healthcare expenditure and the cost drivers is met. The 
cointegration tests applied here are based on an error correction model with an individual 
equation. This requires that the regressors are weakly exogenous with respect to the parameter 
for long-term elasticity, namely βi in Equation A2.1 (see Equation (A2.2). The tests for weak 
exogeneity indicate that, with respect to healthcare expenditure, only the mortality rate for 
women is an endogenous variable (see Table A2.2). In other words, this variable is not 
appropriate for the cointegration tests applied. With an endogenous variable, there is a risk that 
the estimate for the corresponding coefficient will be biased. For that reason, the mortality rate 
for women is not factored into the regressions.  
*** Table A2.2 *** 
The first cointegration test selected is a procedure taken from Banerjee, Dolado and Mestre 
(1998) (BDM). The second is a bounds test developed by Pesaran et al. (2001). Unlike the BDM 
test, the latter can also be meaningful if there are several cointegration relationships between 
the regressors. In order to carry out the cointegration tests, an error correction model in the 
following form has been estimated with the assistance of the least squares method (see also 
Equation (A2.1)):55 
 ∆ht = α0 + γ ut-1 + ∑λj∆yt-j+∑μi,j∆xi,t-j+vt (A2.2) 
 whereby: j:= 0,..,mi,  
mi:= Number of lags of a regressor,  
∆:= First difference,  
ut-1:= Error correction term. 
Statistical proof of a cointegration between the target variables, ∆ht, and the regressors exist if 
the cointegration test shows that the value of the error correction term (ut-1) differs from zero to 
a statistically significant degree. 
 
 
Results 
                                                 
55 For the robust MM estimator, no critical t values are available for the applied cointegration tests.  
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*** Table A2.3 *** 
Apart from the results of the cointegration tests, only the results of the level equations are given 
in Table A2.3 (see also Equation (A2 .1)). The presentation focuses on those equations for 
which at least one of the cointegration tests rejects the hypothesis of a spurious correlation at 
the 10% significance level at least. No cointegration can be demonstrated in any of the 
estimation equations in which Baumol’s cost disease or the mortality rate of men is taken into 
account as an explanatory variable. For this reason, the corresponding results are not listed in 
Table A2.3. According to the results, neither the introduction of the OKP nor the revision of 
the national accounts has had any significant impact on healthcare expenditure (see Table A2.3, 
equations ii-iv, vi-viii). The results also present little evidence for the thesis that the 
development of expenditure can be explained by a deterministic trend (see Table A2.3, 
equations ii, vii-viii). The results concerning the deterministic trend and the mortality rate of 
men can be interpreted in two ways. Either advances in medical technology have no significant 
impact on healthcare expenditure, or the proxies used only reflect advances in medical 
technology to a limited degree.  
 
Even for the third proxy of advances in medical technology, namely R&D expenditure on 
healthcare in the USA, there is no clear statistical proof initially of any influence on Swiss 
healthcare expenditure (see Table A2.3, Equation i). The bounds test shows a cointegration at 
a 10% significance level, although none of the regressors is statistically significant. 
Nevertheless, this result would appear to back up the widely held consensus among healthcare 
economists that advances in medical technology represent a key cost driver in healthcare (e.g. 
Smith et al. 2009). 
 
A long-term correlation can be seen in particular between the ageing of the population, real 
GDP per capita, and real healthcare expenditure per capita. For example, with one exception 
the bounds test reveals a cointegration at a 5% significance level in all equations of this 
constellation (see Table A2.3, equations ii-v). Moreover, the coefficients of both variables in 
these equations are statistically very significant. In the equations involving the density of 
doctors too, a cointegration with healthcare expenditure can be demonstrated at the 5% level 
(see Table A2.3, equations vi and x). If the density of doctors is included in estimation equations 
with real GDP per capita, the coefficient of the latter becomes statistically insignificant. 
However, it emerges that the density of doctors is not exogenous with respect to GDP per capita 
(see Table A2.2). It should therefore be assumed that the development of density of doctors is 
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coupled to economic development and therefore GDP per capita. In the following regressions 
the density of doctors is therefore not taken account of. 
 
One striking aspect is that in the model which includes real GDP per capita and the old-age 
dependency ratio, and in the model which also takes into account the R&D expenditure for the 
USA, the constant in the estimation equation is statistically insignificant.56  
*** Figure A2.1 *** 
This is well illustrated by Figure A2.1. Accordingly the difference of fit of model i – which 
contains a constant – is negligible compared to the same model without a constant. For that 
reason, the constant is not taken into account in any other estimations of models i and v.  
*** Figure A2.2 *** 
For the other estimations of models i and v without a constant, various timeframes are observed 
which are divided according to possible structural breaks in healthcare expenditure. In addition 
to the introduction of the OKP in 1996, Figure A2.2 indicates a possible structural break in the 
mid-1970s. The expenditure trend has flattened off since then. The very dynamic development 
from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s could be attributable to the growing demands made of the 
healthcare system in line with rising prosperity (healthcare as a luxury or superior product). The 
halt to this development could be attributable to the slowdown in the trend of GDP growth in 
the mid-1970s. The reasons for this decline can almost certainly be found in the oil crisis and 
exchange rate adjustments following the collapse of Bretton Woods.  
*** Table A2.4 *** 
The estimates for various time windows, which are geared around the above-mentioned 
possible structural breaks in the time series of real healthcare expenditure per capita, broadly 
show that income elasticity lies at 1.1 if advances in medical technology are excluded (see Table 
A2.4). By contrast, elasticity reverts more towards 1.0 if advances in medical technology are 
considered (see Table A2.4). For the period following the introduction of the OKP (1996-2009) 
a clear weakening of the correlation between the considered cost drivers and healthcare 
expenditure is evident. For equation xii, it is no longer even possible to demonstrate a 
cointegration statistically. One explanation for this could be the period of stagnation 
experienced by the Swiss economy in the 1990s, which did not feed through into the dynamics 
of healthcare expenditure. However, the dynamics of healthcare expenditure can hardly be 
expected to become decoupled from economic developments over the longer term. 
Furthermore, it should be observed that there is only a very small number of data points (14) 
                                                 
56 The results for the constants are not provided in Table A2.3.  
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available for the period after the introduction of the OKP, which impairs the reliability of the 
estimator (small sample bias).  
 
Overall, the results show that taking into account advances in medical technology through 
income elasticity is justified for the expenditure projections, particularly as advances in 
medicine are difficult to quantify. The analysis of the data for Switzerland suggests that a 
plausible value for income elasticity defined in this way is around 1.1.  
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